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Subsequent to World War II a gradual trend toward unification
of the Armed Forces and centralization of control occurred within the
Department of Defense. In addition, the increased requirement for
unit readiness information during the Vietnam War era and the avail-
ability of the computer, contributed to the development and utilization,
by the Marine Corps, of two significant centralized, automated readi-
ness reporting systems. This paper reviewed these two centralized
readiness reporting systems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status
and Identity Report (FORSTAT) and the Marine Automated Readiness
Evaluation System (MARES) and examined their functional impact upon
the U. S. Marine division in the areas of organizational structure,
man-hour requirements, internal decision making, and attitudes of
assigned Marine personnel. Resulting from this analysis specific
recommendations were provided for possible improvements in the
continuing development and utilization of centralized reporting and
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE U. S. MARINE CORPS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Today the Marine Corps, with its 180,000 plus officers and men,
finds itself in the midst of a rapidly expanding technological and infor-
mational explosion. At the present time, in our society, knowledge is
doubling approximately every ten years, with no indication that the pace
will decline in the forseeable future.
The past ten year period, 1964 to 1974, has been particularly
significant in the respect that it has also included the buildup, conduct
and subsequent draw down from a considerable war effort. In addition
this period has seen a change of political parties within the U. S.
Government with a corresponding change in policies and key govern-
mental personnel, plus a fundamental questioning of social and cultural
values by the American people. Among these social and cultural values
under scrutiny, and one of the most significant, has been the relation-
ship of man to a highly organized, technologically oriented society that
is centrally controlled by national and corporate organizations. Both
advocates and opponents of the continued increase in technological and
organizational complexity agree that the social and cultural structure
Reich, Charles A. , The Greening of America , New York:






of- American society has been affected.
Caught up in this rapidly changing environment, the traditional,
bureaucratically structured Marine Corps finds itself striving, both
as an organization and at the individual level, to meet the challenge of
change while at the same time retaining fundamental, traditional beliefs
and values.
To function efficiently in this radically changing environment, the
Marine Corps must possess the dynamic ability to meet the real chal-
lenge of developing and maintaining a modern sophisticated amphibious
force capable of fulfilling its world-wide commitments. Applicable
portions of the current Marine Corps mission include the following:
"The Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, shall be
so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and
three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation and other
services as may be organized therein.
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with sup-
porting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure
or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organ-
izations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide
security detachments for the protection of Naval property at naval
stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct. However, these additional duties may not
detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine
Corps is primarily organized.
The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army
and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain
to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces.
2
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The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components
of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. "
The requirement to assume and fulfill the above responsibilities,
in a changing social and organizational environment, is the challenge
facing the Marine Corps in the 1970's.
Against the backdrop of continuing social, economic, political,
technological and organizational changes affecting the American culture,
this study focuses upon one particular aspect of the changing environ-
4
ment. That aspect is the effect of centralization within the organiza-
tional setting. To analyze this particular topic, a case study technique
will be utilized in which two very significant centralized readiness re-
porting systems, currently affecting the U. S. Marine Corps, will be
reviewed and their impact upon the U. S. Marine division determined.
B. THE EVER INCREASING REQUIREMENT FOR CENTRALIZED
USE OF READINESS INFORMATION
Since 1945 the United States has borne, and continues to bear, the
principal burden of maintaining the worldwide military equilibrium
which insures the security and survival of the Free World. In fulfilling
this responsibility the United States has long recognized the fact that the
world is militarily dominated by two states -- the United States and the
3
Thomas, Gen. C. C. , USMC, Heinl, Col. R. D. , USMC, and
Ageton, R. Adm. A. A., U. S. Navy, The Marine Officers Gu ide.








Soviet Union. Although this division of the world into two major camps
requires the U. S. to be prepared to fight in a nuclear environment, the
requirement also exists for the U. S. to be prepared to intervene mil-
itarily in situations of less than nuclear intensity.
Although the Marine Corps represents a significant portion of the
general purpose forces earmarked for commitment in an all out nuclear
war environment the rapid reaction, hard hitting quality of the Marine
Corps, as a force in readiness, can also be used to great advantage in
tense, rapidly changing crises situations of a strictly conventional nature.
It is this "flexible response" capability of the Marine Corps, covering
the full sepctrum of employment from merely a show of force up to a full
scale commitment, that makes the Marine Corps the logical choice in
executing certain military actions in support of American foreign policy.
In accordance with its amphibious mission, elements of the Marine Corps
are prepared to conduct immediate, quick reaction type operations like
show of force demonstrations or swift incursion type amphibious raids
against a hostile force, or any other level of amphibious operation up to
and including a full scale amphibious assault against a defended hostile
shore.
The speed of modern communications has made it possible for
extremely high levels of control to be exercised during emergencies.
5
U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Landing Force Manua l 01,
Doct rine for Amphibious Operations, Washington, D. C. : Departmenl
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 1967, pp. 1-3. 1-4.
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With operational commands ranging from the local tactical commander
up to the National Command Authority actively monitoring or directing
contingency operations, the importance of precise unit, personnel and
equipment readiness information becomes obvious.
Therefore both before a decision to commit Marine forces has been
made and after their actual involvement, it is absolutely imperative that
timely and accurate unit personnel and equipment readiness information
be available at all echelons concerned. This fact has led to a continually
increasing requirement for the central collection and utilization of readi-
ness information.
C. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
1. The Issue Under Studv
It is the purpose of this study to review currently existing
centralized readiness information reporting systems, now in use by the
U. S. Marine Corps, and examine their functional impact upon the U. S.
Marine division.
2. Specific Objectives of the Study
The study was undertaken with the following specific objec-
tives :
a. Review the trend toward centralization of control,
within the Department of Defense, and the ever increasing requirement
for readiness information at the highest levels of control.
b. Examine the collection, dissemination, mana it,
and usage of operational readiness information within the Marino Corps,
14

w«ith special emphasis upon activities within a typical Marine division.
b. Examine the impact of centralized readiness reporting
systems upon a typical Marine division.
d. Provide recommendations for the improvement of
current and future readiness reporting within the Marine Corps.
D. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT
The scope of the research effort is confined to the following:
1. A review of the background and history of centralization of
control within the Department of Defense and of centralized readiness
information reporting requirements existing within the Department of
Defense in general and the Marine Corps in particular, with special
emphasis upon the past ten year (1964-1974) period.
2. An identification and description of those centrally controlled
readiness information systems that are currently in effect within the
Marine Corps, and have an impact at the Marine division level.
3. An investigation into how a typical Marine division (1)
collects readiness information in response to centrally controlled,
higher level directives, (2) disseminates readiness information to both
highe r and lower echelons, and (3) utilizes readiness information
internally within the division.
4. An analysis of the impact that centralized readiness rting
requirements have had upon the Marine division in terms of the e
upon (1) organizational structure, (2) man-hour requirements, (3)
the decision making process, and (4) individual commande
15

division staff officers, and personnel.
E. ASSUMPTIONS CONTAINED IN THE STUDY
1. The first assumption, carried throughout the study, is that
the procedures and techniques described for a typical Marine division,
generally reflect the conditions existing in all Marine divisions within
the Marine Corps. It is acknowledged that minor variations exist between
units, based upon differences in personnel, situations, and geographical
location. However, it is felt that these variations are indeed minor and
therefore the results of this study generally reflect procedures and tech-
niques currently practiced throughout the Marine Corps.
2. The second assumption is that the Marine Corps can be
closely identified with the traditional bureaucratic organizational model.
As a bureaucratic organization, the Marine Corps is generally subject
to the same influences that affect any bureaucracy in which centralized
control exists. The more familiar of these influences include the
following:
a. Advantages of centralized control;
(1) Centralized control utilizing a centralized net-
6
w ork of communications contributes to more effective coordination.
Blau, Peter M. and Scott, Richard W. , Formal Org anizations,
Scranton, Pa.
:
Chandler Publishing Co. , 1962, p. 126.
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(2) Centralized control contributes to uniform ad-
ministration of an organization.
b. Disadvantages of centralized control:
(1) Less freedom exists for lower level independent
8
action.
(2) Organization executives tend to become special-
ized and therefore cannot readily be moved from one assignment to
another.
(3) Over centralization may lead to an abuse of
10
powe r.
(4) Centralized control may lead to a feeling of
futility and frustration among lower level employees.
F. THE BASIC APPROACH
In order to achieve the stated study objectives, the following




and Simon, Herbert A. , Organizations
,
New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc. , 1958, p. 207.
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Maier, Norman R. F. , Psychology in Industrial Organizations,




Mauzelis, Nicos P., Organization and Bureaucracy , Chicago,
111.: Aldine Publishing Co. , 1973, p. 53.
Hampton, David R. , Summer, Charles E. , and Webber, Roh
Organiza tional Behavior and the Practice of Management, Gleview , 111.:
Scott, Foresman and Co. , 1973, p. 449
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1. Analysis and review of the latest studies, literature and
documents related to bureaucratic organizations, centralization concepts,
and current Department of Defense and Marine Corps policies and activities.
2. Interviews with Marine division personnel, including ex-
perienced division general and special staff officers, reporting unit com-
manders, and selected enlisted technical experts.
3. Observation of current conditions and operating procedures
existing at the Marine division level.
4. Recollections based upon the author's firsthand experience
in helping to develop and set up an operational readiness reporting system
at the Marine division level.
G. THE MODEL
The literature of the social and behavioral sciences reflect a general
agreement on the definition and utility of models. Models serve, to some
12
degree, four distinct functions. These include (1) organizing, (2)
heuristic, (3) predictive, and (4) measuring. It is the first of these,
the organizing function, that is applicable to this study.
By the organizing function of a model, it is meant that a model can
be utilized to order or relate disjointed information and thereby show
similarities or connections between elements of the data that previously
remained unperceived. It is this, identification of relationships between
1 2
Deutsch, Karl W. , The Nerves of Governmen t, Now York:




fatts, that makes the model such an invaluable tool in research efforts.
Models, then, provide a simplified and organized representation of
reality. In addition, models provide an attention-focusing mechanism
for analysis of an issue and reflect the relationship between various fac-
14
tors which cause a particular result or effect. It is this cause and
effect relationship, inherent to models, that makes it possible to outline
this particular study in terms of a model.
To assist in the organization and simplification of this study an ex-
planatory model was developed to represent the relationships between the
various factors under review. The basic model is depicted in Figure 1
and reflects the cause and effect relationships resulting from the trend
toward centralization within the Department of Defense and the eventual
utilization of centralized readiness reporting systems within the U. S.
Marine Corps.
As a logical starting point for this study, the model begins by ident-
ifying certain "causes" occurring within the Department of Defense, that
influenced the evolution and eventual usage of two very significant central-
ized readiness reporting systems. The first of these causal influences
is the continuing efforts, since 1947, toward unification of the armed serv-
ices. Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, a historical review
1 3
Easton, David, The Political System , New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1967, p. 52.
McNallen, James B. , Zand, Dale E. , and Lewin, Arie Y. , 'The
Use of Models for Analyzing the Budget Decision Making Pr . Armed
Forces Comptroller , Washington, D. C. : Vol. IS (2-4), Sprinj
Fall, 1973, p. 1.
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of the trend toward centralization within the Department of Defense is
provided.
The second of the causal factors discussed is the influence of Mr.
Robert McNamara upon the Department of Defense during his service
as Secretary of Defense. In this section the policies and inovations of
Mr. McNamara, that contributed to increased levels of centralization,
are reviewed.
The third area analyzed under the category of causal factors ac-
knowledges the use of decentralized, non-automated readiness reporting
systems prior to the Vietnam war involvement, then addresses the gradual
increase in requirements for readiness information as a result of the war
effort.
The fourth and final area discussed under this particular category
is the development and utilization of the computer. This section presents
the history of computer development both within the Department of Defense
and the Marine Corps and discusses the utilization of the computer as it
can be related to the support of readiness information systems.
Having discussed certain causal factors, the model then identifies
the two most significant centralized, automated readiness reporting sys-
tems currently in use within the Marine Corps. In support of this portion
of the model, a historical review of the development of these two report-
ing systems is provided, and their utilization within the Marine ( is
discussed in detail.
Representing the "effects" associated with the centralization
20

these two reporting systems, the model then identifies three areas that
represent significant impacts upon the U. S. Marine division.
The first of these effects, identified by the model, is a review of
various organization and structural changes within the division that are
directly related to the use of these two reporting systems. The second
area identified by the model, is the change in decision making and control
procedures that have resulted and are now in use within the division. The
third and final effect identified is in the area of impacts upon division per-
sonnel actually involved, in varying degrees, with the two centralized
readiness reporting systems.
The model also provides a time-line reflecting the beginning of cen-
tralization efforts within the Department of Defense in 1947, the initial
use of the two readiness reporting systems beginning in 1968, and the cur-
rent situation, as it exists within the U. S. Marine division in 1974, whe re
centralized, automated readiness reporting systems are fully operational.
A feedback loop is also provided by the model indicating that modifications
or changes desired, during current use within the Marine division, can
contribute to eventual modifications in the utilization of these two central-
ized, automated readiness reporting systems.
The balance of this document addresses the various elements ident-
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•II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. UNIFICATION AND CENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CENTRALIZED READINESS INFORMATION REPORTING
SYSTEMS: U. S. MARINE CORPS 1947 to 1974
As outlined in Chapter I, there were several social-cultural events
and military/organizational factors that contributed to the development
and subsequent utilization of centrally controlled readiness reporting
systems, within the U. S. Marine Corps. Specific causal factors ident-
ified by the model in Chapter I included: (1) the trend, following World
War II, toward unification of the armed services, and gradual central-
ization of control and decision making at the Department of Defense level,
(2) the specific policies and programs established by Mr. Robert
McNamara which led to a high degree of centralization within the Depart-
ment of Defense, (3) increased readiness information requirements
during the Vietnam war, and (4) the development, refinement, and
utilization of the computer during this time period.
Each of the above factors contributed in some way toward the cur-
rent use of centrally controlled readiness reporting systems within the
Marine Corps and therefore are indirectly responsible for the tremendous
impact that these systems have had upon the U. S. Marine division. This
chapter will review each of these causal factors in their historical con-
text. It will also relate the trend toward centralization within the
23

Department of Defense since 1947 with the gradual development of cen-




The basic concept of a central authority collecting and main-
taining readiness information regarding subordinate units is as old as
military history and fundamental to any competent military organization.
In this regard, readiness information represents only one portion of the
total amount of unit, individual and equipment related information that
can be centrally controlled. The primary objective in centrally col-
lecting and maintaining data of various types, including readiness infor-
mation, is generally related to increasing the relative control of leaders
who carry the ultimate responsibility for certain actions plus insuring
that specific military operations or activities support overall unit
objectives.
Down through the ages, military history has reflected a gradual
change in the importance placed upon a unit's readiness posture at a given
time and the availability of readiness information at higher organizational
levels. For example, early military forces were generally formed,
trained and equipped to a desirable level of readiness, then dispatched to
accomplish a specific mission. Under these conditions time and spa
were critical factors, and the survival of a particular Army or Navy was
Brown, Fred R. , (cd. ), Management: Concepts and Prac t !>« s.
Washington, D. C. : Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
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dependent, in many respects, upon the supplies, equipment and replace-
ment personnel either foraged or carried along by the organization. With
the exception of dispatching additional forces and supplies to a deployed
unit, little of anything in the way of assistance could be provided by a
central authority.
An excellent example of how the absence of readiness information
can be disastrous can be seen in our own military history, during the
American revolution. In 1777, General Burgoyne led a British force of
approximately 7,000 officers and men from Canada southward toward
Albany, with the intention of linking up at Albany with additional British
forces which would move up from New York. At Saratoga, along the
western bank of the Hudson River just above Albany, the Americans, under
General Gates, halted the British forces and by a series of battles forced
them into a defensive position alongside the Hudson. At that point, a
mere 40 miles below Albany, General Clinton with the additional British
forces from New York was successfully pushing his way up the Hudson
with sufficient supplies to last both British forces for six months. General
Clinton, as well as the rest of the British forces in America, assumed that
General Burgoyne was in an adequate readiness posture to hold his position
on the Hudson and therefore the force from New York did not advance as
aggressively as it might otherwise have done. Meanwhile, the readiness
posture of the Burgoyne force deteriorated rapidly. Under seige by the
Americans, the British position became grave. Supplies and ammunition
quickly became depleted and Indian and Canadian I roops bej it.
2S

In the end, General Burgoyne surrendered his force to General Gates,
General Clinton returned toward New York and the British effort to
crush the revolting colonies was dealt a severe blow. Had General
Clinton held better readiness information concerning the status of the
forces under Burgoyne, he may have pressed his attack more aggres-
sively and the course of world history might have been altered.
Today, as a result of technological changes, improvements in
communications capabilities and the development of the computer, large
scale military operations have been altered considerably. As these
capabilities have been perfected, the trend has been, especially within
the United States, toward more and more centralization of control.
Today's combatant forces can be likened to the apex of a pyramid or the
point of an arrow. Behind the deployed forces exists a broad column of
supplies, equipment, and replacements leading ultimately back into the
entire American political and economic system. Vital to this structure
are the communications networks including readiness reporting systems
necessary to control and coordinate the effort.
2
.
The Trend Towa rd Unification and Centralization Within
the Department of Defense During the Period 1947 to 1 °74
a. Trend toward unification and centralization during
the period 1947 to I960
Throughout the history of the United States Armed
Forces, there has been a gradual movement toward unification of the
services and a centralization of power within the Department
26

Although this trend has been hotly debated and strenuously contested the
trend nevertheless has continued.
For some 150 years prior to World War II, and up to
the eventual enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the Armed
forces of the United States consisted of two major services, the Army and
the Navy. These two services had been created at different times by sep-
arate legislation, were monitored by separate congressional committees
and in general evolved as separate and distinct organizations. Through-
out this period the Marine Corps, although under occasional threats calling
for its abolution or merger into the major services, continued to exist as
an integral part of the Naval Establishment.
World War II, however, generated certain changes in
organization and attitudes that precipitated a trend toward unification of
the U. S. Armed Forces. As a result of experience in various operational
theaters during the war it was generally acknowledged that unity of com-
mand must replace mutual cooperation as the means for coordinating joint
operations. Although the establishment and utilization of unified commands,
in most operational theaters, led to considerable improvement in coordin-
ation and teamwork, interservice conflicts, competition, and duplication
continued.
Two areas of concern presented the strongest appeal for
unification during this period. The first was the field of logistics where
advocates of service unification felt considerable improvements could be
made to reduce competition and duplication \ the services.
27

other area was the role of strategic airpower where it was felt that an
autonomous Air Force should be established as a separate service, to
insure the highest level of decision making possible regarding the em-
ployment of strategic airpower.
Throughout this period the attitude of the Navy reflected
growing misgivings with the concept of unification because of the threat
of the possible loss of its air arm to a proposed Air Force Department
and even the possibility of the loss of its Fleet Marine Force to the Army.
After World War II, spokesmen for the Navy continued
to lead the opposition against unification efforts. Unification, they felt,
was not simply a matter of top organization but "struck deeply into the
traditions, fiber, morale, and operations of the military services", and
16
therefore should be approached with considerable caution.
The separate services were not alone in voicing their
opinions regarding the relative merits of unification. Othe r participants
included the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. Although
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been established early in the war years by
President Roosevelt, to carry out allied strategy, the JCS members were
understandably partisans of their respective services. Nor could the
Departmental Secretaries be expected to agree on fundamental role and
Yoshpe, Harry B. and Bauer, Theodore W. , Defense Organization
and Manageme nt, Washington, D. C. : Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1967, p. 14.
28

mission issues raised by the individual services. To resolve the problem
it became increasingly clear that the President and Congress needed a
single individual, a civilian, to control the services and thereby insure a
systematically coordinated defense policy that supported national objectives,
Out of the above was born the National Security Act of
1947 which attempted to bring the Armed Services under one roof, and
provided for a more coordinated relationship between military and civilian
elements of the government. Subsequent ammendments to this Act and
reorganization efforts in 1949, 1953 and 1958 would contribute to the pro-
cess of eventually making centralization a reality within the Department
of Defense.
The National Security Act of 1947 is significant to this
study in that this particular Act laid the groundwork for many later de-
cisions and policies that could lead toward more and more centralization
within the Department of Defense. The Act was a compromise of differing
opinions and arguments set forth as a result of the varying motivations
of the participants involved. Yet few people questioned the need for some
degree of unification of effort among the services and overall centraliza-
tion of control. As an example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower made the
following comments based upon his experience as supreme Allied Com-
mander during World War II:
"During those long months in Europe, my associates and I ra:
to understand that in a major conflict there was no such thing as a
separate land, sea, or air war. Single purpose and direction and
careful balancing of forces were necessary. We also came to b<
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that in the broader field of preparation and production of forces,
'in planning and control of operations, a closely knitted headquarters
in Washington would add to material efficiency and economy." 17
General of the Army, George C. Marshall, had also
noted in 1940 the need for "a highly organized team, a balanced team,
in contrast to a few highly developed specialities each operating some-
1
8
what according to its own theory of combat."
The Act was signed into law on 26 July 1947, followed
the same day by an executive order further delineating service roles and
missions. Although the 1947 Act did not eliminate the roles and mission
controversy it did contribute toward a more unified approach to National
Defense. Reflecting the compromise between service positions, Congress
made the intent behind the Act clear, in its "Declaration of Policy".
"To provide three military departments for the operations and
administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and
the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their
assigned combat and service components; to provide for their con-
trol but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic
direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified
control and for their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval, and air forces. " * '
To implement the intent of the Act, Congress estab-
lished the National Military Establishment which included the services
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1 9Yoshpe, Op. cit . , p. 18.
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the head of the new organization to exercise general direction, authority
and control over the three separate executive departments.
Thus, at this point, after some 150 years of service
separation the U. S. had begun a conscious move toward unification of
forces and centralized control within the Department of Defense.
During the period between 1947 and 1949, the new and
first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, managed to get the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to resolve many of the disagreements regarding service
roles and missions, but inter-service rivalry continued and the Joint
20
Chiefs could not agree on integrated national strategy. This led the
Secretary to seek a means of strengthening his authority over the military
departments. As a result the Hoover Commission on "Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government" was established to review the
problem. Among the recommendations of the Commission was a call for
greater centralization of authority in the Secretary of Defense subject
only to the President and Congress, plus improved teamwork throughout
the national security organization.
Incorporating many recommendations and changes pro-
posed by Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the Hoover Commission the
National Security Act Ammendments of 1949 were adopted. By means of
these ammendments much of the present Department of Defense structure
was established. The former National Military Establishment was
20
Caraley, Demetrios, Th e Politics of Military Unification.
New York: Columbia Unive rsity Press , 196b, pp. 280-285.
31

converted into an executive department and renamed the Department of
Defense, the three services became military departments rather than
executive branches, and most significantly the Secretary of Defense was
now given unqualified direction, authority and control over the Depart-
ment of Defense. By thus strengthening the position of the Secretary of
Defense, the 1949 Ammendments marked a significant step toward firm
unification of the services and centralization within the Defense establish-
ment.
The next step in this process of gradual centralization
within the Department of Defense occurred as a result of the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea in 1950. The outbreak of the Korean war found the
Defense Department still debating the question of what level of centraliz-
ation or decentralization was appropriate for management of the Defense
establishment. In addition, interservice conflicts continued regarding
disagreements over the size and composition of forces best suited to sup-
port national policy. Although the limited scope of the Korean war
allowed the Defense establishment some latitude in resolving internal
disputes, it was apparent that major conflicts between the services re-
garding strategy, and roles or missions could be detrimental to any future
war effort.
At the end of the Truman administration, as General
Eisenhower was preparing to assume the presidency, further change of
the Department of Defense was recommended by both the outgoing and in-
coming presidents. These changes addressed the problem of insuri
32

the U. S. was prepared to fight wars of limited scope and objectives.
At this point the first real mention of "readiness
posture" was discussed. The Korean war had pointed out the lack of
readiness of America to fight limited wars. Up until this point the U.S.
had, to a large extent, based its military doctrine and planning upon the
concept of general war in which the country and economy would be grad-
ually mobilized, much as had occurred in World War II. However, it was
now becoming obvious that the U. S. must be ready to conduct not only
general war but also to fight limited wars for limited objectives. The
basic policy, which has not been substantially changed by succeeding ad-
ministrations, had been set forth by Secretary of Defense George C.
Marshall in September of 1950
"For the last 5 years our supreme policy has been to curb Com-
munist aggression and, if possible, to avoid another world war in
doing so. The execution of this policy has required extraordinary
patience, firmness and determination in meeting and helping our
allies to meet challenges in Iran, Greece, Turkey, Trieste, Berlin,
and Indochina, and finally Korea. There can be, I think, no quick
and decisive solution to this global struggle short of resorting to
another world war. The cost of such a conflict is beyond evaluation.
It is, therefore, our policy to contain Communist aggression in
different fashions in different areas without resorting to total war,
21
if that is possible to avoid. "
In line with this new direction of foreign policy, in which
the United States would maintain the capability to conduct both limited
objective engagements and general war, the case for additional central-
ization of control was strengthened. With the termination of operations
21




in Korea, the Eisenhower Administration made it clear that the Armed
Forces and defense expenditures were to be reduced and that the military
was going to be brought under greater subordination to civil authority
and policy.
To improve the readiness posture of the Armed Forces,
the Eisenhower Administration rejected the earlier concept of establish-
ing a predetermined future Mobilization Day (M-Day) toward which the
services would strive in terms of a given level of readiness. The ob-
jection to this approach was that it alledgely led to static planning, ex-
pensive training, and was conducive to the accumulation of obsolete
equipment. In place of this approach, the floating D-Day concept was
introduced. Under this concept, a particular future date and anticipated
readiness level was not established. Rather the date was allowed to float
ahead and as the services approached the desired readiness level speci-
fied, the date and readiness requirements were advanced. Thus the
buildup of the services was geared to an evenly paced partial mobilization
for an indefinite period, that was constantly being revised to reflect the
changing requirements dictated by world events. The significance of
this particular approach, during the Eisenhowe r Administration, was
that the services were encouraged to gradually improve their overall
readiness posture on a continuous basis subject to annual funding and
programing restraints. In essence, this approach marked a significant




controlling element in overall national defense planning.
In further response to the Eisenhower influence, a
committee was constituted to review the basic organization and procedures
within the Department of Defense with particular attention on the position
of the Secretary of Defense and his principal civilian and military officials.
The results of this committee's efforts became the basis of Reorganization
Plan No. 6 of 1953 which set forth three basic objectives. These included
(1) a clear and unchallenged responsibility in the Defense Establishment,
(2) maximum effectiveness at minimum cost, and (3) the best possible
military plans. For purposes of this research, the first objective is the
most significant. To achieve this particular objective it was made clear
that the lines of authority within the Department of Defense would be such
that there could no question as to the direction, authority and control of
the Secretary of Defense over all the agencies and components of his de-
partment. There was to be a single line of authority from the President,
in his capacity as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense and
no function within the Department of Defense was to be performed inde-
pendently of the Secretary of Defense. Thus the gradual centralization of
power over the services was continuing at the Secretary of Defense level.
The next significant event in this gradual process was the Depart-
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Critics of the defense organ-






striving to acquire an arsenal of weapons which would allow it to carry
out virtually any and all missions. To counter this trend and to study the
aspects of further centralization of control, the Rockefeller panel of 1956
had been appointed. It was the opinion of this panel that the military
services were becoming competitive rather than complimentary and their
actions were not in accord with the best interest of national defense
policies.
Pressure for further organizational change was again
coming from the President. President Eisenhower felt that there was a
need for clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted
civilian authority and that clear organization and decisive central direction
would be required to end continuing interservice disputes.
It was at this point that the concept of unified and speci-
fied commands was introduced, by the Rockefeller Panel, as a solution to
the lack of control over the services by the Secretary of Defense. This
fundamental concept was enacted by the Department of Defense Reorgan-
ization Act of 1958, thus establishing the present day chain of command
structure for national defense as shown in Figure 2. Under this Act all
operational forces were to be organized into unified or specified commands
which would perform missions dictated by strategic requirements. How-
ever, the military departments would no longer be responsible for con-
ducting combat missions but were to be confined to providing recruiting,
training, supplies, and similar type support to the unified commands.
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the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and specified commands was
clearly spelled out in the Act.
"With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the
President, through the Secretary of Defense,, shall establish uni-
fied or specified combatant commands for the performance of
military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such
combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department
of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the
Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant com-
mands by the departments concerned for the performance of such
military missions."
In essence, the reorganization had provided a vast
increase in the authority of the Secretary of Defense by shortening the
chain of command to the operational forces. It was hoped, by Congress,
that this additional centralization of power at the Secretary of Defense
level would increase the overall efficiency of the Department of Defense
and avoid the general tendency toward Service rivalry and controversy.
b. Continuing Trend Toward Centralization During the
Period 1961 to Present
With the onset of the Kennedy administration in 1961,
the stage had been set and the lines of authority sufficiently established
for the newly appointed Secretary of Defense to bring the defense estab-
lishment to a level of centralized control never before experienced by the
Armed Forces.
The appointment of Mr. Robert McNamara in I960 as
Secretary of Defense resulted in many far reaching effects upon the
23
Yoshpe, Op. cit. , pp. 42-44,
38

A^rmed Services. In fact current centralized readiness reporting systems
now in use within the services can, to some degree, trace their origin
back to the information collecting systems implemented during the
McNamara years to support centralized decision making.
In order to justify the increased centralized authority
of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara pointed to the mandate given
him by President-elect Kennedy in the State of the Union Message of 29
January 1961. In this speech the new President stated that he had in-
structed the Defense Secretary to:
"Reappraise our entire defense strategy; our ability to fulfill
our commitments; the effectiveness, vulnerability and dispersal
of our strategic bases, forces, and warning systems; the efficiency
and economy of our operation and organization; the elimination of
obsolete bases and installations; and the adequacy, modernization,
and mobility of our present conventional and nuclear forces and
weapons in the light of present and future dangers."
The framework for many of the innovations introduced
by Mr. McNamara, was also influenced by the concept of "flexible re-
sponse" which was first used by the Kennedy Administration and later by
the Johnson Administration. This concept called for a capability to con-
duct a controlled and deliberate level of warfare ranging from brush -fire
or peripheral type wars up to a nuclear engagement. To meet the require
ments under this policy, Mr. McNamera believed that greater efforts
should be made to obtain more reliable and meaningful information for
use by top level decision makers. In this regard various organizational
24
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39

changes were made throughout the Defense Department to insure that the
required information for integrated decision making was provided.
Additional centralization of power occurred during this
period due to the establishment of defensewide activities and agencies.
These agencies and activities, which are with us today, were established
in an effort to extend integrated management techniques to common supply
and service activities. Significant among these, for purposes of this study,
were the Defense Communication Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and
i
Defense Supply Agency.
Throughout his tenure of office, Mr. McNamara indica-
ted that he saw his position as that of an active leader rather than a
passive judge. He also felt that although the actual operation of a program
could be managed on a decentralized basis, unified planning, programming,
and decision making were indispensable to effective management and must
occur at the top of the decision pyramid. Mr. McNamara made clear his
belief in active management from the top when he made the following
statement.
"In many aspects the role of a public manager is similar to that
of a private manager. In each case he may follow one or two al-
ternate courses. He can act rather as a judge or as a leader. As
the former he waits until subordinates bring him problems for so-
lution, or alternatives for choice. In the latter case, he immerses
himself in his operation, leads and stimulates an examination of
the objectives, the problems and the alternatives. In my own case,
and specifically with regard to the Department of Defense, the re-
sponsible choice seemed clear."
25McNamara, Robert S. , The Esse n ce of Security , New York:
Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 87-88.
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To increase the decision making capability of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara also initiated the systems
26
analysis technique. Much has been written regarding the use of this
analytical technique including both its contribution to and dependency
27
upon a centralized environment. A significant contribution of this tech-
nique to centralization, and an area related to this study, is the fact that
subordinate organizations throughout the Defense Department were re-
quired to provide the necessary information to support this integrated
approach to decisionmaking.
Program budgeting was another control system instituted
within the Defense Department during the McNamara years that contributed
28
to further centralization. Although program budgeting greatly increased
both the degree of civilian control of the Defense Department and the in-
centives for efficient resource allocation, certain problems were created.
One of the effects of centralizing the responsibility for decisionmaking,
in the Secretary's office, was to cut off competiton among the Services in
designing and developing systems for mutual missions. Thus once com-
peting systems were ruled out, the Secretary had little choice but to follow
Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, Wayne K. , How Much is Enough ?
New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 60-71.
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Murdock, Dr. Clark, "Policy Consequences of Systems Analy
in the Military", Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Jung Hotel, New Orleans, La. .
September 4-8, 1973, pp. 1-3.
Hitch, Charles J. and McKean, Roland N. , The Economic-
Defense in the Nuclear Age, New York: Atheneum, - .
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tKe chosen systems through to completion, regardless of cost. Also, as
a result of centralized decision making, the Secretary's office assumed
control over many issues that simply were not important enough to justify
its concern. For example, at one point, Mr. McNamara himself dec reed
that the traditional Marine belt buckle would be replaced with a standard
29Army buckle, as a cost saving measure. In the opinion of critics,
over- centralization had reached a dangerous point and the services had
been divested of their autonomy to the point that a vacuum had been created
in which only the Secretary or his staff could make decisions.
Centralization within the Department of Defense under
Mr. McNamara was and still is a much debated issue. Proponents of
strong centralization contended that it was required due to modern scien-
tific and technological advances which significantly revolutionized defense
strategy. In addition, they felt that centralization was necessary to control
inter-service rivalries, reduce duplication of effort, and keep defense
costs within manageable levels. Critics, on the other hand, complained
of reduced morale of military leaders, a tendency for military judgment
and professional experience to be downgraded, the reduction of creative
thought and initiative, and the fact that centralization was setting the stage
for eventual unification of the services.
29
Singer, Neil M. , Public Microeconomics, Boston, V
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Following the above chronological history of central-
ization in the Defense Department, the next and final significant event was
the appointment of Mr. Melvin Laird as Secretary of Defense. Among
other accomplishments the net effect of the Laird Administration was to
strip power from the office of the Secretary of Defense and return it to the
services. President Nixon's pledge to "correct over-centralization" was
echoed by Mr. Laird in a 1971 speech.
"I inherited a system designed for highly centralized decision-
making. Over-centralization of decision making in so large an
organization leads to a kind of paralysis. Many decisions are not
made at all, or, if they are made, lack full coordination and com-
mitment by those who must implement the decisions. The traffic
from lower to higher echelons may be inhibited; relevant and essen-
tial inputs for the decision maker can be lost. In addition, there
seemed to be insufficient participation by other agencies with im-
portant responsibilities for national security. "
Although a large percentage of the centralized systems
and procedures established during the McNamara years were retained, in-
cluding various readiness information reporting systems, the power of the
office of the Secretary of Defense was significantly reduced and consider-
able decision making power returned to the services in an agreement
signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, the Service Secretaries
31
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July of 196 9. This agree
ment marks the latest event in the chronological review of levels of cen-
tralization within the Department of Defense since there have been no
30






significant efforts by subsequent Secretaries of Defense or the Services
32
to alter the above "Truce" agreement.
3. History of Centralized Readiness Information Reporting
Within the Marine Corps During the Period 1947-1974
The history of centralized readiness information reporting
within the Marine Corps, during the period 1947 to 1974, also reflects
the influence of the social-cultural events and military/organizational
factors discussed in Chapter I. In this respect, the first part of this
chapter addressed two of the specific causal factors identified by the
model in Chapter I. This included a chronological review of (1) the
gradual trend toward unification of the Armed Services and centralization
of control and decision making at the Department of Defense level during
the period 1947 to I960, and (2) the specific policies and programs
established by Mr. McNamara, subsequent to 1 960, which contributed
to the continuing trend toward centralization within the Department of
Defense. The first part of this chapter also addressed the influence
of Mr. Laird and subsequent Secretaries of Defense whose policies have
established the degree of centralization that currently exists within the
Department of Defense.
This final section of this chapter will address the remaining
two, specific, causal factors identified by the model in Chapter I. These
32
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factors, which helped contribute to the eventual utilization of centrally
controlled readiness reporting systems within the Marine Corps, will
be discussed at the appropriate historical point during a general review
of the history of centralized readiness reporting within the Marine Corps.
The factors to be discussed include (1) the increased need for readiness
information as a result of the Vietnam War effort, and (2) the influences
resulting from the development, refinement and availability of the computer.
a. Trend Toward Utilization of Centralized Reporting
Systems within the Marine Corps
The development of centralized reporting systems, in
general within the Marine Corps, can be traced to 1949 when the Marine
Corps began to mechanize personnel reporting into what came to be known
as the Personnel Accounting System (PAS). This forerunner of later re-
porting systems was gradually changed from a manual accounting operation
to a machine processed procedure which provided accurate current per-
sonnel data and a complete historical record of each Marine's service
career. As a management tool this system was again expanded, in I960,
to a computer- oriented system for use throughout the Marine Corps to
provide detailed personnel information for use in various planning activi-
ties. The second significant centralized reporting system to be initiated
by the Marine Corps was the Supply Accounting System (SAS) which is the
technique for recording the receipt or expenditure or other disposition of
materials used by the Marine Corps. This computer oriented system was
established in 1958 and subsequently utilized by all large Marine Cor-
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supply activities. The third major reporting system to be mechanized and
centrally controlled was the Fiscal Accounting System (FAS). This sys-
tem was established to account for appropriated funds at various command
levels. As time went by and the Marine Corps entered the 1960's it be-
came obvious that faster and more accurate readiness reporting methods
would be required throughout the Marine Corps. Fast moving world events
placed increased emphasis on the need for better control and for long-
range planning.
The actual development of centralized readiness infor-
mation reporting systems can be traced to October of 1962 when the
Department of Defense provided guidance to the services for the develop-
33
ment and operation of a Force Status and Identity Reporting System.
From this guidance the Marine Corps developed and utilized the Opera-
tional Status Reporting System (OPSTAT), up until November of 1968,
when it was replaced by the existing centralized readiness reporting system
to be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
b. The Increased Need for Readiness Information
as a Result of the Vietnam War Effort
It was the Vietnam war period that saw the real devel-
opment of the contemporary centrallized readiness reporting systems.
As a result of the involvement in Southeast Asia, it quickly became obvious
3 3
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that up to date, accurate readiness information was an absolute necessity.
Since the deployed Marine units were at the receiving end of the personnel
and logistics support pipeline, the readiness posture of a particular com-
bat unit was directly related to its personnel and logistic status. In addition,
since troops were trained in CONUS before assignment to Vietnam, the
training readiness posture of deployed units was generally excellent. There-
fore, the real emphasis on readiness, for deployed units, was in the area
of logistics. The continuing demand for all types of logistic support dic-
tated the establishment of a supply, equipment and maintenance pipeline
extending back to various supply points located within the United States.
It was this requirement for continuing, accurate and efficient support that
virtually guaranteed the development of a centralized logistics readiness
reporting system.
The tempo of operations, during this period, placed
heavy demands upon the training and staging units partcipating in the per-
sonnel and logistics support pipeline. Therefore, the requirement to
centrally control resource inputs also contributed to the eventual use of
centralized readiness reporting systems, not only within the Marine Corps,
but throughout the Department of Defense.
It can be seen, then, that the increased requirements
for unit readiness information, as a result of the Vietnam war involvement.
coincided with the period of centralized control advocated by Mr. McNamara,




c. Influences Related to the Development, Refinement,
and Utilization of the Computer
The development of the computer for govermental use
can be traced to June of 1948 when the National Bureau of Standards
entered into a contract with the Ecke rt-Mauchly Company for the con-
struction of a Univac for Census computations. The first Univac ever
built was subsequently accepted by the Government on March 31, 1951,
and is still in use today by the National Bureau of Standards.
The first utilization of computers by the Marine Corps
began in December of 1951 with the creation of a Data Processing Pla-
34
toon utilizing mobile, van-mounted installations. Within one year the
Marine Corps had established thirteen computer installations, and within
four years each Marine division and Aircraft wing was utilizing computers
for detailed inventory management of extensive supply accounts. Reflecting
this rapid increase in the use of computers, 1963 found a total of 37 Data
Processing Installations operational throughout the Marine Corps.
Due to the increasing tempo of operations during the
mid- 1 960' s, as a result of the Vietnam involvement, the Marine Corps
supplemented its existing automated equipment with the purchase of seven
IBM 360 computers, in August of 1967. Thus the equipment to support a
centralized readiness reporting system existed as early as 1967.
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Since much more readiness information could be main-
tained and evaluated utilizing computerized systems, and a clear need
existed for current readiness information at high decision making levels,
the development and subsequent utilization of a centralized, computerized,
readiness reporting system was inevitable.
d. The Systems Approach Era
Realizing the need for a master plan during the develop-
ment of various Marine command and control, management, and informa-
tion systems, the Marine Corps, in 1969, published a document titled
"Master Plan for Marine Corps Command and Management Systems Devel-
opment." This document clearly spelled out the extent of centralized
reporting that was to take place within the Marine Corps. As stated in
this master plan:
"The role of the U. S. Marine Corps as a force-in- readiness
and its position within the structure of the Department of Defense
creates unique requirements for responsiveness in Marine Corps
Command and Management Systems. "
In addition the goal and extent of this new approach was indicated by the
master plan:
"The ultimate goal of Marine Corps Command and Management
Systems is to provide timely and accurate responses in the perform-
ance of Marine Corps missions. The entire set of systems, functional,
tactical, and information, by which the Commandant and subordinate
commanders acquire and direct resources, comprise the Command
and Management Systems of the Marine Corps. These Command and
Management Systems include all acquisition or control actions em-
ployed by commanders."
3 5
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Regarding the often debated question of centralization
vs decentralization of control the new master plan clearly spelled out the
Marine Corps position and proposed course of action:
"In order to effectively utilize limited resources, all activities
of the Marine Corps will strive to centralize the information process
in Marine Corps Command and Management Systems as warranted by
systems requirements."
Following publication of the Master Plan in 1969, the
Marine Corps rapidly became involved in the development of, or support
of, a large number of centralized reporting systems. This period of time
in the Marine Corps also came to be known as "The systems approach
era." To support this evolution, a Data Systems Division was established
at Headquarters Marine Corps to control and manage the various reporting
sy steins within the Marine Corps.
The current level of involvement, by the Marine Corps,
in centralized reporting systems is extensive. A list of the currently
active centralized control and reporting systems is provided in Figure 3.
Of those systems identified in Figure 3, the last two are of interest to this
research effort. The specific centralized readiness reporting systems
which will be discussed in detail throughout the remainder of this document
are: (1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity Report






1. JUMPS Joint Uniform Military Pay System
2. MMS - Manpower Management System
3. ASIS - Amphibious Support Information
System
4. MEDS - Mechanized Embarkation Data
System
5. AMMO - Automatic Ammunition Accounting
6. MAGFARS - Marine Air Ground Financial
Accounting Reporting Systems
7. FREDS - Flight Readiness Evaluation System
8. MIMMS - Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance
Management System
9. NMMMS - Navy Maintenance and Material
Management System
10. NORMPAY - Normal Pay System
11. SUADPS - Shipboard Uniform Automated Data
Processing System
12. SASSY - Marine Corps Supported Activity
Supply System
13. FORSTAT - Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status
and Identity Report
14. MARES Marine Automated Readiness
Evaluation System
Figure 3. Centralized Control and Reporting Systems
Involving the Regular Marine Corps
51

III. EXISTING READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS
A. SPECIFIC READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS AFFECTING
THE MARINE CORPS
As identified by the model, set forth in Chapter I, the centralized,
automated readiness reporting systems that have evolved and are cur-
rently being supported by the Marine Corps are (1) The Joint Chiefs of
Staff Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT), and (2) The Marine
Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES). These two reporting
systems were originally combined and were introduced on 1 November
1968 as the "Marine Corps Operational Effectiveness Reporting System."
These new automated readiness reporting systems, which replaced a very
limited, complicated, message type readiness report titled "Operational
Status Reporting System (OPSTAT), " were designed with the following
objectives in mind:
"The objectives of the Marine Corps Operational Effectiveness
Reporting System are to provide commanders at all echelons with
timely receipt, adequate storage, prompt retrieval, and valid
analysis (including prediction) of data relating to readiness and status
of forces information. "
This chapter addresses both of the above readiness reporting
systems in detail.
"3 O
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022051 Jan. 71, Hawaii: Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 1971, p. 1.
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1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity
Report (FORSTAT )
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity Report
(FORSTAT), which became operational within the Marine Corps on
November 1, 1968, has undergone considerable revision during sub-
sequent years. However, the fundamental purpose of this readiness
report, which is only one of several reports within the Joint reporting
structure that is required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has not substan-
tially changed. The overall purpose of the "FORSTAT" report is as
follows:
"FORSTAT has been established as the single automated report
within the Department of Defense to provide the National Command
Authorities (NCA),(i.e. the President and the Secretary of Defense)
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with authoritative basic identity and
status information concerning units/organizations of the Armed
Forces of the United States."
In addition, the FORSTAT reporting system was established
40
for the specific purpose of: (1) Reporting for registration each unit/
organization of the Armed Forces of the United States and each organiza-
tion of other agencies, both foreign and domestic, as required, (2)
reporting basic identity and changes thereto of designated U. S. and
foreign organizations, (3) reporting status information concerning units/
organizations of foreign nations committed to exercise/operations with
39
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT ).
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U, S. forces, and (4) providing a single framework for the reporting
of required organization and status information, by all levels, to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
FORSTAT is the medium by which all reporting commands
submit status and readiness information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Re-
ports are required from Chiefs of Services (separate services), command-
ers of unified and specified commands (CINC'S), major service commands,
separate service operating commands, CINC component commands, and
Fleet Marine Forces (which include all Marine divisions, Aircraft wings
and Force Troops units).
In addition to the specified information needs of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Marine Corps has an additional vested interest in the
reporting of readiness information to a central high level authority. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for the administration,
discipline, internal organization, training requirements, efficiency, read-
iness, and total performance of the Marine Corps. These responsibilities
require the receipt, by Headquarters Marine Corps, of timely and detailed
information which reflects the current and projected capabilities of the
Fleet Marine Forces to execute contingency and general war plans. Further,
as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps is a National Command Authority and is responsible to support and
participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on matters that directly concern the Marine Corps. In addition, the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps is also responsible for providing support to
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the World Wide Military Command and Control System.
To meet the above requirements, of both the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Marine Corps as a service, the "Marine Corps Operational
Effectiveness Reporting System" was established, as stated earlier, and
included the FORSTAT and the MARES readiness reporting systems.
Thus the Marine Corps was able to utilize only one reporting system to
meet both the internal needs of the Marine Corps and those of the Joint
Chiefs without duplicating the procedures or the reporting requirements
of subordinate units.
Information reported under the Marine Corps Operational
Effectiveness Reporting System was detailed and extensive. The system
required that Fleet Marine Force, and unit commanders, submit infor-
mation regarding personnel, training, logistic status, copies of contin-
gency plans and orders, the commander's evaluation of the combat
readiness of his command, and, when applicable, combat status reports.
Once the FORSTAT reporting system became operational and
all concerned became familiar with its procedures, command interest
became an important aspect throughout the chain of command. This was
demonstrated by the Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific
when he stated in a message to his subordinate commanders:
"Combat readiness reports are closely monitored at his head-
quarters as one of the most important indications of the capability
of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Good management demands ac-
curate and current decision supporting information. Accordingly:
(1) commanders at all echelons must insure that units with re-
sponsibility for reportable information provide accurate and compl<
data to the reporting activity at the time needed, (2) intermediate
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commanders must insure reports are forwarded without delay due
to the perishability of status information, and (3) reports must be
viewed as an evaluation of the unit's ability to carry out its assigned
mission and to highlight deficient areas.
The history of the Marine Corps recounts its readiness for combat.
The Commandant has stated that it behoves every commander to
insure that readiness is computed realistically and accurately. I
enjoin each commander to extend every effort to make combat read-
iness a matter of vital everyday concern among the personnel of
your commands. "
On 29 February 1972, following approximately four years of
reporting, the Marine Corps Operational Effectiveness Reporting System
was terminated as a combined FORSTAT and MARES reporting system.
At that time the two readiness reporting systems became independent
with the FORSTAT report becoming a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed re-
port and the MARES system becoming a Marine Corps only requirement.
Although the FORSTAT report became strictly a Joint Chiefs
of Staff directed report, very few other changes were included. The
format and detailed reporting requirements of the 29 February 1972
change were promulgated by means of Joint Chief of Staff publication 6,
Vol. 11, Part 2, Chapter I, and remain in effect today.
What then makes up the FORSTAT report, how is it reported,
and what is the reporting criteria?
Within the Marine Division, which is the level of command
addressed by this research effort, FORSTAT reports originate at the
individual battalion, and separate company/batte ry/platoon/team level.
Fleet Marine Force Pacific Message, Op. cit . , pp. 2-3
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as well as headquarters companies/batteries of the regiments. As
shown in Figure 4, reports are then forwarded through the operational
chain of command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus providing readiness
information to all levels of command.
Each of the reporting units, identified by the levels just
described, are registered in the FORSTAT reporting system with a
unique, six character, alphanumeric, Unit Identification Code (UIC).
This UIC serves as the prime identifier of that reporting unit and re-
mains with the organization throughout its existence.
The primary reporting medium for all reporting commands
is by means of punched cards. FORSTAT detail cards are identified by
a one-character code (e.g. card type D, K, etc.). Information submitted
by individual reporting units within the FORSTAT system includes read-
iness data related to the following four distinct areas: (1) general
status, (2) personnel status, (3) combat readiness status, and (4)
equipment and crew status.
a. What is general status data?
General status data (card types, D, and DM1) include
information related to a unit's location, what unit it reports to for admin-
istrative and operational control (ADCON/OPCON), the name and rank of
the commanding officer and the name and rank of the particular unit
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b. What is personnel status data?
Personnel status data includes the actual personnel
strengths of a reporting unit. This information is reported on card
types J and JM1
.
(See Appendix B). The required personnel readi-
ness information includes, among other items, structured, authorized,
assigned, and possessed strengths for Marine commissioned, Marine
Warrent, Marine enlisted, Navy commissioned, and Navy enlisted.
Reports are required upon significant change, when a change of ten
percent from the last submission occurs, or on the last working day
of each month.
c. What is combat readiness status data?
Combat readiness data (card type K) is the most impor-
tant of all the FORSTAT cards since it provides a summary of a unit'.s
readiness posture. The combat readiness reported is a measure of a
unit's ove rail ability to perform its assigned combat mission. Criteria
has been established to place a unit in a C-l , C-2, C-3, or C-4 readi-
ness category, (C- ratings to be identified later within this chapter). When
submitting this readiness information, a unit will establish a C- rating
for each of four categories: personnel, equipment/supplies on hand,
equipment readiness, and training. In addition an overall C- ratine is
established for the unit plus a forecast of any anticipated changes in read-
iness posture. Reports are required as changes occur, when a forecasted




d. What is equipment and crew status data?
Equipment and crew status information (card types L
and M) include the readiness status of major equipment authorized and/
or possessed by registered reporting units or organizations and the re-
lated status of crews formed and ready to man this equipment. Generally,
information reported on major equipment is related to: (1) type, (2)
quantity operationally ready, (3) location if different than home station,
and (4) numbers of crews authorized, formed and ready. Reports re-
lated to major equipment information are required when changes occur.
(See Appendix B).
e. How are amplifying remarks submitted?
In addition to the above, one additional card (type R) is
provided to allow a reporting unit to include information in amplification
of any section of that unit's FORSTAT report. (See Appendix B). This is
accomplished by means of general remarks submitted on the R-card which
accompany the remainder of the unit's readiness report submission.
R-card reports are required when: (1) a unit has been placed in a cadre
status by a higher authority, (2) when a unit commander desires to rate
his unit at a readiness level not supported by established C- rating per-
centages, or (3) when amplification/justification of any part of the unit's
FORSTAT report submission is desired/ required.
f. What is the reporting criteria?
Combat readiness reporting criteria (C- ratings) : rine
Corps units have been established for the four resource areas, personnel,
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equipment/supplies on hand, equipment readiness, and training. In
addition reporting crieteria has also been established for an overall
composite readiness rating. These C- ratings are used when reporting
on card type K.
Marine Corps organizations are designed to accomplish
the primary Marine Corps mission of service with the fleet in seizure or
defense of advance naval bases and for the conduct of those land opera-
tions that may be considered essential to the prosecution of a naval cam-
paign. Combat readiness is measure against this requirement and includes
the evaluation of the readiness status of all assets required to accomplish
a specified mission. In addition, readiness reporting criteria specifies
that reporting, related to the four measured resource areas and the
overall combat readiness rating, will be based on official Marine Corps
"Tables of Organization" (T/O's) and "Tables of Equipment" (T/E's)to
insure uniform readiness evaluation and reporting procedures throughout
the Marine Corps.
A detailed outline of the FORSTAT readiness reporting
criteria is provided in Appendix C. (See Appendix C).
FORSTAT, then, is the acronym for "Joint Chiefs of
Staff Force Status and Identity Report." It is one of several reports that
provide timely and accurate information to the National Command Author-
ities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, the CINC's unified and




The Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES)
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the "Marine
Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES)" was originally a part
of the "Marine Corps Operational Effectiveness Reporting System" along
with the FORSTAT Report.
The MARES readiness reporting system also became opera-
tional on November 1, 1968, along with the FORSTAT report and provided
the detailed logistic readiness data necessary to complete the overall
readiness evaluation of a reporting unit.
Whereas FORSTAT is utilized in all branches of the Armed
Services and is centrally controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MARES
is utilized just within the Marine Corps to report detailed status of read-
iness in the areas of equipment/supplies on hand and equipment readiness.
Thus it can be seen that the MARES readiness reporting system supports
the FORSTAT reporting system, in that the MARES provides additional
detailed logistic information related to two of the four measured resource
areas identified in the FORSTAT report.
The MARES reporting system was born as a readiness infor-
mation system with the objective of closely supporting the FORSTAT
system required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, it was gradually
realized that the MARES system served as an excellent means of identi-
fying specific equipment maintenance and supply problems within the
Marine Corps. Thus MARES has gradually evolved into an independent
reporting system in its own right. As with the FORSTAT System, on
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29.February 1972, the MARES was no longer a part of the "Marine Corps
Operational Effectiveness Reporting System" but rather stood alone as a
Marine Corps unique logistics readiness reporting system. This arrange-
ment of two independent, but intimately related, parallel readiness reports
exists today.
From the above, it can be seen that under these two reporting
systems, (FORSTAT and MARES), lower level Marine Corps reporting
units submit total and detailed readiness information through two separate
systems. One, through FORSTAT to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with infor-
mation copies provided to Headquarters Marine Corps, and two, through
the MARES System directly to Headquarters Marine Corps where the de-
tailed information can then be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other
interested parties in the extent or detail that the Marine Corps judges
appropriate.
The "Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES) '
has considerable potential as a management tool throughout all echelons
of the Marine Corps. The key words in this title are "Readiness" and
"Evaluation." MARES can provide an accurate picture of a unit's material
"readiness," and if the picture is sufficiently accurate, the system can be
an excellent source of information for evaluating the courses of action
necessary to improve a unit's material readiness. In this regard the sys-
tem can aid unit commanders, at all levels, in the decision making process
by identifying problem areas requiring command attention.
63

a. What makes up the MARES Report?
Basically the MARES system utilizes three card types I
report a unit's readiness condition. The three card types used are LM1
,
LM2, and RM4. (Note that the MARES system utilizes a three digit card
type code, whereas the FORSTAT utilized a two digit code).
b. Supply Status Report - LM1 Card.
The purpose of the supply status report is to provide
Headquarters Marine Corps and intermediate level Marine Corps com-
manders with information on the requisition status related to the "table
of equipment" deficiencies of combat essential equipment within a unit
and identification of those critical requisitions necessary to bring a unit
to a C-l supply and equipment readiness status. The LM1 card is not a
requisition but simply identifies the requisitions that have been submitted
by a reporting unit. Submission of this information is required on a daily
basis. (See Appendix D).
c. Equipment Status Report - LM2 Card.
The purpose of this MARES data is to provide Headquarters
Marine Corps and intermediate commanders with information on the status
of combat essential equipment. This report reflects authorized and pos-
sessed amounts plus the status of deadlined combat essential equipment.
The report is submitted daily to (1) initiate reporting on now items of
combat essential equipment and (2) to report an item of combat essential
equipment to or from deadline or to change the status of the deadlined
equipment. (See Appendix D).
64

d. MARES Logistics Remarks - RM4 Card.
The purpose of the MARES logistics remarks are to pro-
vide Headquarters Marine Corps and intermediate commands with nar-
rative comments related to the Supply Status Report - LM1, and the
Equipment Status Report - LM2 submissions. These reports are sub-
mitted daily as required. (See Appendix D).
e. General Comments Regarding MARES System.
The relationship of the MARES system to the FORSTAT
report is in the areas of supplies/equipment on hand and equipment read-
iness (two of the resource areas measured by the FORSTAT report). The
C-ratings for these two categories are determined in accordance with the
criteria identified in Appendix C for the FORSTAT report. Therefore,
whereas the FORSTAT reflected a unit's C-rating in the four resource
areas, the MARES provides, on a unit-by-unit, item-by-item basis, the
amounts of reportable equipment authorized, possessed, and deadlined.
The MARES logistic reporting system, then, is a method
utilized by the Marine Corps to report detailed status of equipment and
supplies, and equipment readiness information.
3. Readiness Reporting Procedures
The purpose of this section is to look at how readiness infor-
mation is collected, processed and transmitted within the Marino Corps
utilizing the FORSTAT and MARES reporting systems. The scope of this
section is limited to a discussion of those procedures applicable to
typical Marine division. As an example of reporting within a typical
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Marine division, the following paragraphs reflect practices now in
operation within the 1st Marine divi-sion.
a. Information Collection Procedures within the
Marine Division
Within the Marine division readiness information is
collected by means of the FORSTAT and the MARES reporting systems.
In both cases readiness information originates at the individual unit/
organization reporting level. Reporting units at this level include indi-
vidual battalions and separate companys/batteries/platoons/teams as
well as the headquarters companies/batteries of the regiments.
Concerning the FORSTAT side of readiness reporting,
each reporting unit/organization within the Marine division has designated
two unit FORSTAT coordinators, one officer and one enlisted, who pre-
pare the report, obtain approval of the commanding officer, and, then,
hand carry it to the division headquarters. A report submission may
consist of one or all of the FORSTAT data cards discussed earlier.
Regarding the MARES reporting procedures, each report-
ing unit/organization has assigned one officer and one enlisted man with
the duties of MARES officer and MARES clerk respectively. As with the
FORSTAT report, these personnel, in each reporting unit, develop the
MARES report in accordance with higher level directives, obtain approval
for submission from the unit commanding officer, and hand carry the
report to the division headquarters.
The most important aspect of the reporting step, Is the
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accuracy and quality of the information reported. Commanding office ri
of reporting units are continually enjoined to insure that information re-
ported under both the FORSTAT and MARES systems is as accurate as
humanly possible within the time constraints involved.
b. Processing of Readiness Information within the
Division Headquarters
Concerning the processing of FORSTAT readiness in-
formation, all input data is centrally accumulated by the Division
FORSTAT Officer. Upon receipt of the input, all data is checked for
accuracy and format. Any errors are noted and compiled for subsequent
publication in a monthly error rate listing. All input information is then
key punched on computer cards and assigned the appropriate security
classification. A complete unit FORSTAT report, containing detailed
readiness data, is classified SECRET. Following conversion of the input
to computer cards, a "recap" of significant changes contained in the
current report plus a summary of the readiness status of each reporting
unit is routed through the division staff for approval. Following concur-
rence by all key staff officers, the report is signed by the Assistant Chief
of Staff G-3, for release. The approved deck of input cards is then pro-
cessed by an IBM 360 computer which processes the report through 1 1
audit/edit programs to insure accuracy. At this point the Division
FORSTAT Officer delivers the approved report to the Division Communi-
cation Center for release to higher headquarters.
Processing of MARES reports at the division level is
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similar to those described above for the FORSTAT report. Since MAKES
reports are submitted daily, it becomes a daily responsibility of the
Division MARES action officer and his staff to screen all input for accur-
acy and completeness. All reporting errors are resolved immediately
by telephone calls or conferences between the appropriate unit command-
ers and the division representatives. When the input has been determined
to be accurate it is converted to punched computer cards, processed
through an error/edit procedure, approved for release and delivered to
the Division Communications Center for transmission.
c. Transmission of Readiness Information by Division
The primary method of transmitting FORSTAT and MARES
readiness information is by means of the World Wide Automatic Digital
Network (AUTODIN). FORSTAT information is reported through designated
reporting channels and terminates at the Alternate National Military Com-
mand Center (ANMCC) for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MARES reports
are also submitted via AUTODIN but terminate at Headquarters Marine
Corps. Under special circumstances (deployment etc.) where a reporting
unit does not have access to AUTODIN capabilities, reports can be sub-
mitted by teletype or message.
4. Complexity of Readiness Systems Review
It has not been the intent of this chapter to provide a detailed
review or outline of Standing Operating Procedures for individual unit
reporting under the FORSTAT and MARES readiness reporting s s.
The main intent has been to provide sufficient background, concernii
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these two complicated, centrallized, readiness reporting systems to




IV. IMPACT OF CENTRALIZED READINESS REPORTING
SYSTEMS UPON THE U. S. MARINE DIVISION, AS A
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
From the beginning of his social existance, man has had to depend
upon organizations. As man progressed up the scale of civilization his
dependence upon organizations also increased. Contemporary man now
,
42
finds the organization a primary determanant of his social existence.
Addressing the third and final aspect of the model presented in
Chapter I, this chapter will examine the U. S. Marine division as a
bureaucratic organization and analyze the effect of centralized readiness
reporting systems upon its operation. The analysis presented in this
chapter reflects research data which was compiled by means of (1)
analysis and review of applicable studies, professional literature and
official documents, (2) extensive interviews with appropriate Marine
personnel,' (3) observation of current operating procedures, and (4)
recollections based upon the author's personal experience at the Marine
division level.
To properly address the impact of centralized , computerized,
readiness information reporting systems, upon the Marine division, it
is first necessary to briefly discuss, organization theory and examine how
Whyte, William H. Jr., The Organization Man , Garden City.
N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, pp. 1-15.
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the Marine Corps, as an organization, reflects certain aspects of clas-
sical and contemporary theory. To accomplish this, the first portion of
this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the Marine Corps as it
represents a bureaucratic organization. The remainder of the chapter
will then address the Marine division, as a part of a larger Marine Corps
bureaucracy, and identify the various impacts of centralized readiness
reporting systems.




The term organization is here defined as "a form of social
grouping which is established in a more or less deliberate or purposive
43
manner for the attainment of a specific goal." In the above definition,
the words purposive and goal are significant since it is organizations that
provide the necessary structure whereby man, in a purposive manner,
can coordinate his activities and efforts in order to achieve a specific goal.
Organizations can be described as formal or informal depend-
44
ing upon their structure and purpose. This chapter will only address
formal organizations, as they can be related to the U. S. Marine Corps.
The study of formal organizations, as those delibera:
established to accomplish a certain purpose, should begin with Max Weber.
Weber was the first serious writer to analyze the development and
43
Mouzelis, Op. cit . , p. 4.
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character of the bureaucratic organization. The product of his analysis
is known in the literature, as the "Weberian Model."
The development of bureauc ratic organization theory actually
grew out of an effort by Weber to define authority structures or relation-
45
ships within organizations. The three types of authority identified by
Weber included (1) the charismatic, (2) the traditional, and (3) the
rational-legal. It was this third type of authority system, the rational-
legal system, that was seen by Weber as the dominant institution of
modern society. For this system Weber used the term bureaucracy. He
considered the system to be rational because the organization functions
like a well designed machine with a certain function to perform and every
part of the machine contributes to the attainment of that function. The
system is considered legal because authority is exercised by means of a
system of rules and procedures through a particular office which is occupied
46
by an individual at a particular time.
Weber felt that a bureaucratic organization is technically the
most efficient form of organization possible because precision, speed,
unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict
reduction of friction, and reduction of material and personal costs are all
45
Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations ,
Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1947, pp. 324-382.
46
Pugh, D. S. , Hickson, D. J. and Hinings, C. R. . Writers on
Organizations , Middlesex, England: Penquin Books, 1971, p. 18.
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raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration.
4
The reason for the efficiency of the bureaucracy, as scon by
Weber, lies in its organizational form. He enumerated the distinctive
characteristics of this type of organization as follows:
"1. Clear-cut division of labor. Organization tasks are dis-
tributed among the various positions as official duties. Implied is
a clear-cut division of labor among positions which make possible
a high degree of specialization. Specialization, in turn, promotes
expertness among the staff, both directly and by employees on the
basis of their technical qualifications.
2. Hierarchical authority structure. The positions or offices
are organized into a hierarchical authority structure. In the usual
case this hierarchy takes on the shape of a pyramid wherein each
official is responsible for his subordinate's decision and actions as
well as his own to the superior above him in the pyramid and where-
in each official has authority over the officials under him. The
scope of authority of superiors over subordinates is clearly circum-
scribed.
3. Formal rules and regulations. A formally established sys-
tem of rules and regulations governs official decisions and actions.
In principle, the operations in such administrative organizations
involve the application of these general regulations to particular
cases. The regulations insure the uniformity of operations and,
together with the authority structure, make possible the coordina-
tion of the various activities. They also provide for continuity in
operations regardless of changes of personnel, thus promoting a
stability lacking in charismatic movements.
4. Impersonal orientation. Officials are expected to assume
an impersonal orientation in their contacts with clients and with
other officials. Clients are to be treated as cases, the officials
being expected to disregard all personal considerations and to main-
tain complete emotional detachment, and subordinates are to be
treated in a similar impersonal fashion. The social distance be-
tween hierarchical levels and between officials and their clients
intended to foster such formality. Impersonal detachment is de-
signed to prevent the personal feelings of officials from distorting
their rational judgment in carrying out their duties.
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5. Career oriented employees. Employment by the organization
constitutes a career for officials. Typically an official is a full-
• time employee and looks forward to a lifelong career in the agency.
Employment is based on the technical qualifications of the candi-
date rather than on political, family or other connections. Usually
such qualifications are tested by examination or by certificates
that demonstrate the candidate's educational attainment. Such ed-
ucational qualifications create a certain amount of class homogeneity
among officials. Officials are appointed to positions, not elected,
and thus are dependent on superiors in the organization rather than
on a body of constituents. After a trial period officials gain tenure
of a position and are protected against arbitrary dismissal. Renum-
eration is in the form of a salary, and pensions are provided after
retirement. Career advancements are made according to seniority,
or achievement, or both. "
Since the articulation of the Weberian bureaucratic organization
model, a number of other writers have also addressed the topics of bur-
eaucracy and organizational theory. Significant among these has been
F. W. Taylor, H. Foyal, L. Gulick, M. P. Follet and R. K. Merton.
Briefly reviewing the contribution of each of these writers, the first, Taylor
focused upon the basic physical activities involved in production in an effort
to identify the most efficient utilization of the human organism in the pro-
48
ductive process. Known as the theory of scientific management, Taylor's
contributions have had a significant impact upon the field of organization
theory.
Building upon the Taylorian concepts, Foyal attempted to extend
this rational type thinking from the plant level to the firm as a whole.
Foyal' s main contribution was an effort to develop a set of general principles
7
Blau, Op. cit. , pp. 32-33.
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concerning how to build and manage an efficient organization.
As another significant contribution to organization theory,
Gulick developed a theory regarding the identification and departmental-
ization of the individual tasks necessary to achieve a given purpose. As
Gulick envisioned it, the problem was to group related tasks into individual
jobs, group jobs into administrative units, group units into larger units,
50
and finally to superimpose top level departments over the larger units.
Of the two additional writers making significant contributions
to organizational theory, Follet addressed the concepts of joint responsi-
bility and multiple leadership as an alternative to the strict chain of com-
51
mand existing in a bureaucratic structure. As the remaining writer
indicated above, Merton's main contribution was to identify certain negative
aspects of bureaucracy including the lack of flexibility inherent in a bur-
52
eaucratic organization.
The contribution of the above social scientists and other writers
has not detracted from the tremendous influence of Weber's ideas upon
organization theory. The bureaucratic organization, in Weber's view,
maximizes rational decision-making and administrative efficiency because
disciplined performance by experienced, qualified experts who are governed
9Mouzelis, Op. cit .
, pp. 4, 201-202,
50
March, Op. cit .
, pp. 22-25.
51
Pugh, Op. cit. , pp. 102-104.
52
Mouzelis, Op. cit . , p. 55.
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by abstract rules and coordinated by the authority hierarchy, contributes
to the rational and consistent pursuit of organizational objectives.
2. The Marine Corps and Bureaucratic Organization Theory
As a mission oriented organization the Marine Corps is a
formal organization in accordance with the goal directed criteria. As a
formal organization, established and structured by law, the Marine Corps
can also be viewed as an organization which demonstrates the general
characteristics of the rational-legal or bureaucratic organization des-
cribed by Weber.
An analysis of the Marine Corps, and comparison against the
characteristics of Weber's bureaucratic organization, supports the ident-
ification of the Marine Corps as a bureaucracy. In this regard the Marine
Corps is hierarchical authority structure, one of the characteristics
identified by Weber, since it was established as a military organization
53
with a defined structure. In addition a clear-cut division of labor exists
within the Marine Corps organization, as demonstrated by the assignment
of Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) codes to all Marines, which
effectively limits the assignment of individuals to certain general areas of
service. Also a formal table of organization (T/O) has been established,
for every unit in the Marine Corps, with a separate line number established
for each type of billet. Formal rules and regulations control the activities
of individual Marines ranging from the control exercised by the Uniform
53
Thomas, Op. cit. , pp. 39-40.
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Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to the use of Standing Operating Proced-
ures (SOP's) by individual units. An impersonal relationship between
members at different levels in the hierarchy is also stressed and many




Significance of Analyzing the Marine Corps Against
Bureaucratic Organization Theory
The purpose of analyzing the Marine Corps against bureaucratic
organization theory is the fact that centralization within formal organiza-
tions, including the bureaucratic organization, has traditionally resulted
in certain advantageous or disadvantageous impacts upon the organization.
It is that specific aspect that will be addressed in the balance of this chapter.
What has been the impact of centralized readiness reporting systems upon
the U. S. Marine division, as a bureaucratic organization?
B. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT, OF CENTRALIZED READINESS
REPORTING, WITHIN THE MARINE DIVISION
Although numerous centralized reporting systems are now in use by
the Marine Corps, none have had the impact upon the operational units,
such as the Marine divison, as have the readiness reporting systems. Con-
cerning this impact, one of the general areas affected has been organiza-
tional, as it relates to both structural changes and increased man-hour
requirements. Reflecting extensive interviews with 1st Marino Division
personnel, each of these organizational related areas is discussed bel
in terms of the changes that have occurred. These changes were determined
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by comparing conditions in the Marine division as they existed before and




Prior to implementation of the FORSTAT and MARES report-
ing systems within the Marine Corps, the 1st Marine Division had only one
officer, a major, assigned to develop and report unit readiness data under
the old Operational Status (OPSTAT) reporting system. This officer was
assigned as an operations officer in the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
office and had the assignment of readiness reporting officer as an ad-
ditional duty. The designated officer assembled readiness information
from various internal division message reports and developed a message
type readiness report for release by the command.
During the period when the OPSTAT reporting system was
utilized within the division, the division headquarters was structured in
the typical form shown in Figure 5. Certain aspects of that headquarters
staff structure can be contrasted with the current 1st Marine Division
organizational structure established in response to and as a result of the
FORSTAT and MARES reporting requirements.
In response to, and as a result of, the FORSTAT and MARES
reporting requirements one of the most significant organizational changes
has been the establishment of a Division Combat Readiness Central/Man-
agement Analysis Section, under the staff cognizance of the Assistant Ch
of" Staff, G-3.
The Division Combat Readiness Central (DCRC) porl f this
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new structure was established to provide the Commanding General with
timely accurate information concerning the combat readiness status of
the 1st Marine Division and to establish centralized coordination and con-
trol over readiness reporting systems, primarily FORSTAT.
Subordinate to the new Division Combat Readiness Central, is
the Management Analysis Section. This section was established to coord-
inate the collection and presentation of management data to support estab-
lished division management analysis procedures.
The stated mission of the new Division Combat Readiness
Central, including the Management Analysis Section, is as follows:
"The mission of the DCRC is to assist the Commanding General,
Division Staff, and subordinate Commanding Officers, in coordin-
ating programs designed to maintain a high state of combat readiness
within the 1st Marine Division and to provide for the collection and
54
presentation of associated management data. "
The functions inherent in the mission of the DCRC are:
a. Centralize the control of FORSTAT readiness reporting
systems.
b. Provide a focal point for the collection, recording, anal-
ysis, and display of data related to the combat readiness of the 1st Marine
Division.
c. Develop, coordinate and maintain a division readiness
briefing and decision making system titled "The Division Program Progress
54
1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Divi sion Combat Readiness
Central/Management Analysis Section , 1st Marine Division Order JO . 12A,
Camp Pendleton, Calif.: 1 st Ma rine Division, 1972, pp. 1-2.
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Report System" (to be discussed later in this chapter, as it relates to
decision making).
d. Establish and coordinate the activities of a Division
Combat Readiness Committee for the purposes of developing and re-
viewing the readiness posture of reporting units. (To be discussed
later in this chapter as it relates to decision making).
e. Coordinate staff actions required to develop and maintain
management data for use in the monitoring of readiness related problem
areas.
f. Maintain liaison with higher and lower headquarters,
within the reporting chain, in readiness/management related matters.
g. Monitor the existing FORSTAT readiness reporting sys-
tem and recommend improvements as required.
As an addition to the division structure, this new Division
Combat Readiness Central/Management Analysis Section has been added
to the division organizational diagram, shown in Figure 5, and is located irrfe r
the staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. The internal
structure is as shown in Figure 6.
The requirement to staff this new addition to the division
structure has also altered the assignment of personnel within the division
headquarters. Originally, prior to the FORSTAT system, readiness re-
porting requirements were simply an additional duty. However, the com-
plexity of the new readiness reporting system dictated a permanent cha-















time basis. The manpower requirements are as presented in Table 1.
It should be noted that this change in the division staff structure repre-
sents a change to the existing table of organization of the division
headquarters and therefore dictates some alteration in assignments to
insure that the division does not exceed its authorized personnel strength.
By means of a published 1st Marine Division Order (Div. O.
3000. 12A) the mission and purpose of the DCRC were officially established,
and the related responsibilities of all general and special staff, and sub-
ordinate commanding officers were outlined.
Another structural alteration within the division organization
has resulted from incorporation of the MARES readiness reporting system.
In this case, the change does not involve the establishment of a separate
organization under the cognigance of a general staff officer, but rather
simply the designation of a separate and additional, area of responsibility
directly under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-4, is assigned the additional duty of "Division MARES Officer .
and as such is responsible for all division activities related to the MARES
readiness reporting system.
To accomplish this additional duty the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-4, has designated a MARES officer and two MARES clerks who arc re-
sponsible for maintaining the timeliness of MARES submissions and the
accuracy of the MARES data base.
In addition to the above, two other structural changes have












Asst. Director Captain 9910 1
CRC Operations Chief M/Sgt 0369 1
Admin Man L/Cpl 0151 1
FORSTAT Section
FORSTAT Officer Lt. 9911 1
Reports Analyst M/Sgt 0369 1
FORSTAT Staff NCO Gy/Sgt 0369 1




NCO in charge Sgt 8711 1
Draftsman Cpl 8771 1
Admin Man/Driver L/Cpl 0151
4 8
Table 1. Combat Readiness Central Organization
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readiness reporting systems. The first of these has been the requirement
for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, the Adjutant and the Division Com-
munications Officer to designate a member of their particular staff section
to become sufficiently knowledgable regarding the new reporting systems
to insure proper coordination during reporting. The second has been at
the individual reporting unit level and involves each command designating
one officer and one enlisted man with the responsibility of reporting under
the FORSTAT system, and an additional officer and enlisted man to report
under the MARES system. In both cases designations at the reporting unit
level are generally on an additional duty basis.
2. Man-Hour Requirement Changes
One of the most significant organizational requirement changes
resulting from the change to the FORSTAT and MARES system has been
the increased man-hours required for readiness reporting.
a. Man-hour Requirements Directly Related to FORSTAT
and MARES reporting
Under the original OPSTAT message type readiness re-
porting system, the reports were manually developed and staffed by one
officer within the division G-3 section. Based upon information obtained by
interviews with officers who were present at that time, the approximate
monthly OPSTAT reporting man-hour requirements, displayed in Table Z,
have been computed.
Under the current FORSTAT and MARES readiness reporting




1 G-3 reports officer at approx. 2 days/week
= 16 hrs/weekx 4 weeks = 64 hrs/mo.
1 clerk typist at approx. 3 hrs/week x 4 wks. = 12 hrs/mo.
Others (coordination, reviews, etc. ) at
approx. 1 hr/week x 4 weeks = 4 hrs/mo.
1 officer or enlisted (develop information at
reporting unit level) at 1 hr week
x 4 wks. x 32 units = 1 28 hrs/mo.
Total Man-Hours/mo. -- = 208 hrs/mo.
Table 2. Monthly OPSTAT Reporting Man-Hours
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Table 3 summarizes these Man-Hour requirements. As shown in Table
3, for the FORSTAT reporting system, a total of 2350 man-hours p
month are required for the complete development, assembly, coordination
and submission of the report. For the MARES report, which is submitted
at a higher frequency, a total of 8,288 man-hours per month are required.
Combined, a grand total of 10,638 man-hours per month are required for
the complete submission of these two centralized readiness reports. With-
out question these systems represent a considerable increase in manpower
requirements and therefore reflect a significant impact upon the manpower
requirements of the Marine division.
b. Training Requirements
Another significant requirement, affecting the division
as an organization, has been the increased requirement for the training
and education of all personnel involved in the FORSTAT and MARES re-
porting systems.
Although this is a Marine Corps wide problem, the scope
of this particular study, limits the discussion to the Marine division level.
As a solution to this problem, the 1st Marine Division
has implemented a number of new procedures and programs. Among these
relating to FORSTAT, has been the development of a Commander's Guide
to FORSTAT reporting, a FORSTAT Programmed Instruction Booklet, a
FORSTAT Unit Level Coordinator's Orientation Handout, and a four hour
formal FORSTAT training program. The training program provides an in-





1 officer/ 1 enlisted at 6 hrs/week for sub-
mission x 4 wks/mo. xlman = 24 hrs/i
1 officer/ 1 enlisted at 1 hr/week for Report,
Reconciliation x 4 wks/mo. x 1 man = 4 hrs/mo.
Transportation to division; 1 hr/submission
x 4 submission/week x 4 wks/mo. = 16 hrs/mo.
Delivery at Division; 1/2 hrs/submission
x 4 submission/week x 4 wks/mo. = 8 h rs/mo.
Sub-total = 52 hrs/mo.
Total; with 32 Reporting Units; 32 x 52 = 1664 hrs/mo.
Division Level
1 officer & 1 enlisted; check input;
2 men x l/2hr/unit x 4 submissions/
week x 32 units x 4 wks/mo. = 512hr/mo.
1 enlisted; key punch new info. ;
3 hrs/day x 5 days/week x 4 wks/mo. = 60 hr/mo.
1 enlisted; develop recap sheet;
1/2 hr/day x 5 days/week x 4 wks/mo. = 10 hr/mo.
1 enlisted; coordination & delivery to
Computer Center;
1/4 hr/day x 5 days/week x 4 wks/mo. = 5 hr/mo.
1 officer & 2 enlisted; run report;
3 men x 1-1/2 hr/day x 5 days/
week x 5 wks/mo. = 90 hr/mo.
1 enlisted; deliver report to Comm. Center;
1/4 hr/day x 5 days/week x 4 wks/mo. 5 hr/mo.
1 officer; Briefings for General & Special
Staff; 4 hrs/mo. = 4 hr/mo.
Total = 686 hr/mo.
FORSTAT Overall Total Man-Hours/Mo. -- 23 50





1 officer & 1 enlisted; Submission &
Reconciliation;
28 hrs/wk. x 4 wks/mo. x 2 men = 224 hrs/mo.
Transportation to Division; 1 hr/submission
x 5 submissions/week x 4 wks/mo. = 20 hrs/i.
Sub-total = 244 hrs/mo.
Total; with 32 Reporting Units; 32 x 244--- = 7808
Division Level
1 officer & 2 enlisted; (Review, Assembly,
Coordination & submission of Report;
3 men x 8 hrs/day x 5 days/week
x 4 wks/mo. = 480 hrs/mo.
MARES Overall Total Man-Hours/Mo. = 8288
Combined Total FORSTAT and MARES =10,638
man/hrs / mo,




that reporting unit commanders have qualified personnel within their units
to compile, evaluate, and submit timely and accurate FORSTAT reports.
On the MARES side of the readiness reporting system,
the division has published a Standing Operating Procedure for MARES
reporting, has developed and promulgated a MARES Unit Commander's
Reference Guide, and also provides a unit level training program as
required.
c. Inspections
As with any centrally controlled system, a continuing
requirement also exists for through, detailed procedural inspections at
various levels within the reporting chain of command. In this respect,
announced, scheduled inspections are conducted periodically throughout
the year. Beginning at the lowest level, each quarter of the fiscal year,
the Division FORSTAT Officer and the Division MARES Officer conduct
formal inspections of the division reporting units. These inspections are
always announced and involve the evaluation of the procedures used at the
reporting unit level as compared to a published check-off list. These in-
spections are designed to correct any reporting problem areas that could
conceivably hamper accurate and timely readiness reporting.
In addition, on an annual basis, all reporting divisions are
inspected by the appropriate Fleet Marine Force Headquarters plus
from Headquarters Marine Corps.
From the above, then, it can be seen thai another impact
of the centralized readiness reporting systems has been the additi rial
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man-hours and effort required to either prepare for or conduct inspections
within the Marine division.
C. IMPACT OF CENTRALIZED READINESS REPORTING
SYSTEMS UPON DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE
MARINE DIVISION
The development and utilization of a centralized readiness informa-
tion reporting system will generally have an impact upon organizational
decision making because of the increased availability of management in
-
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formation. To examine that aspect, this section will provide a brief
review of applicable decision making theory followed by a discussion of the
observable impacts upon decision making at the Marine division level, as
a result of centralized readiness reporting systems.
1
.
Applicable Decision Making Theory
A survey of contemporary literature on the subject of decision
theory reveals a plurality of opinion as to the natural character and applic-
56
ability of this field to the task of management. This heterogeneous
nature however ought not be interpreted as a reflection of the importance
of decision theory but rather it is an indication of its novelty and complex
55
Sollenberger, Dr. Harold M. , Major Changes Caused by the
Implementation of a Management Information System, New York: National
Association of Accountants, 1973, p. 1.
Greenwood, William T. , Decision Theory and Information Systems ,
Cincinnati, O. : South-Western Publishing Co. ,
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Research of decision making literature has resulted in f
major findings that are either common to most decision theories or con- .
5 7
stitute major changes in existing decision theories and practices. First,
at higher levels of larger organizations possessing the necessary cap-
abilities, systems analysis and systems models are generally found to be
the common denominator of most modern decision processes. Secondly,
information is found to be the prima ry ingredient upon which all types of
problem solving and decision making processes depend. Third, current
theory now recognizes the existence of subdecisions as an integral part of
the complete problem -solving and decision making process, rather than
viewing decision making as simply a final decision choice at the end of the
problem- solving sequence. Fourth, current theory also recognizes the
trend toward an increased use of logic or systematical analysis in decision
making as compared to a more intuitive approach which was used in the
past. Fifth, there is an increasing requirement within organizations, for
middle management staff personnel who are qualified and capable of sound
decision making within today's complex organizational structures.
For purposes of this study the only facet of decision making
theory that will be addressed in any detail is that of rational decision making
within the organizational structure. Rational decision making as discussed
by J. G. March and H. A. Simon is applicable to this discussion since it
is generally representative of the decision making conditions experienced
57 ... .
Ibid, pp. ill- iv,
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the Marine division commander utilizing his general and special division
stall members. March and Simon identify four characteristics of the
environment in which rational decision making is conducted. These include:
a. In the decision making situation the decision maker has
developed a set of alternatives from which he will choose his action.
b. To each alternative is attached a set of consequences
or events that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen. In this
regard three categories of consequences exist. These categories are,
(1) certainty, where it is assumed that the decision maker has complete
and accurate knowledge of the consequences that will follow each alternative,
(2) risk, where an accurate knowledge of the probability distribution re-
lated to the consequences of each alternative is assumed, and (3) uncer-
tainty, where the decision maker cannot assign definite probabilities to the
occurrence of particular consequences.
c. Before making the decision, the decision maker has a
preference-orde ring that ranks all sets of consequences from the most
preferred to the least preferred.
d.When making the decision, the rational decision maker selects
the alternative leading to the preferred set of consequences. In the case of
certainty, the choice is clear and unambiguous. In the case of risk, the
rational decision maker selects the alternative with the greatest expect
utility. For the case of uncertainty, the rational decision maker will base
CO
March, Op. cit ., pp. 137-138,
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his decision upon a particular decision criteria (e.g. maximizing the
minimum possible gain, minimizing the maximum possible loss., eti
Organizational decision making is a complex activity,
especially in cases of uncertainty or risk. Under any condition, however.
the decision maker may utilize techniques ranging from pure intuition to
an analytical approach like system analysis. Systems analysis being de-
fined as:
"A systematic approach to helping a decision maker choose a
course of action by investigating his full problem, searching out
objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the light of their
consequences, using an appropriate framework -- insofar as possible
analytic --/to bring expert judgment and intuition to bear on the
problem. "
Although rational decision making, as defined by March and
Simon, generally reflects the decision making process carried out in the
Marine Corps organizational environment, there are a number of other
influences affecting decision making at the Marine division level. In ad-
dition to the constraints of time, money, limited manpower, etc. , decision
making in the Marine division is also influenced by the fact that the divi-
sion is a bureaucratic organization and therefore subject to the character-
istics oC bureaucratic decision making. These characteristics include a
5 9
Bierman, H., Bonini, C. P. and Hausman, W. H. , Quantitative
Analysis for Business Decisions , Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, In .
1973, pp. 70-71.
Quade, E. S. and Boucher, W. I. , Systems Analysis and Pol:
Planning Applications in Defense, New York: American Else>
Publishing Co., Inc., 1968, pp. 2, 31 and 425.
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standardized, rigid, repetitive approach to decision making generally
resulting in a predictable, straight-forward, impersonal organizational
61
response.
Reflecting the above brief review of applicable decision making
theory, the balance of this section now addresses the specific, observable
impacts upon decision making, at the Marine division level, as a direct
result of utilizing centralized readiness reporting systems.
2. Impact Upon Decision Making at the Marine Division Level
a. The Division Program Progress Report System (DPPRS)
The development and utilization of the FORSTAT and MARES
readiness reporting systems has provided the Marine Corps with a vast
amount of constantly changing readiness information designed for use in
high level decision making. To adequately collect, process and present
this information along with other related information, each headquarters
from Headquarters Marine Corps down to the division level utilizes a man-
agement information system. At the headquarters level this system is titled
the "Marine Corps Program Progress Report System", (MCPPRSK
This progress report system consists of periodic, d<
tailed, formalized briefings to a commander and his staff, in selected
subject areas, with all. information maintained and updated in a report
booklet. At the Headquarters Marine Corps level this system provides
information on programs relating to the nine subject areas ^( readiness,
^cNallen, Op. cit . , pp. 4-8
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aviation, manpower, logistics, supply, financial, reserve, research
and development, and system development. This information is presented
to assist the Commandant, Headquarters Staff and selected field command-
A?
ers in control, planning and decision making. It is not by accident that
readiness is listed as the first of the nine subject areas. With the mission
of "A Force in Readiness", readiness information is one of the most im-
portant single aspects that must be considered in all Marine Corps de-
cision making.
At the division level a similar system is utilized, titled
"The Division Program Progress Report System (DPPRS)," Although
additional information is also maintained and presented by means of this
system, it is basically an outgrowth of the large volume of information gen-
erated within the division, most of which is concerned with readiness.
At the division level, the system also consists of formal
briefings and the development and maintenance of a publication to provide a
continuing and formal reference document for use by the Commanding Gen-
eral, his staff, and senior and subordinate commanders, in planning and
decision making.
f> ?
U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Prog rain Progress Report
System (MCPPRS) , Marine Corps Order 5200. 9D, Washington, D. C. :
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1971, pp. 1-2.
1st Marine Division, Division Program Progress Report i
(DPPRS), 1st Marine Division Order 5213. 2A, Camp Pendleton, Calif.:
1 st Marine Division, 1972, pp. 1-5.
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The primary impact, at the division level, however, is
not the actual utilization of this program progress reporting system, but
the fact that the review of detailed readiness information has become such
an important consideration or procedural aspect in the decision making
process.
b. Division Combat Readiness Committee
The Division Combat Readiness Committee, which is also
utilized to assist in decision-making, is a direct outgrowth of the utiliza-
tion of readiness reporting systems within the Marine Corps. The com-
mittee meets at the direction of, and is chaired by, the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3. In addition to the G-3, the Director of the Combat Readiness
Central and selected subordinate commanders are involved. The main
purpose of this committee is to evaluate and resolve problem areas related
to the readiness posture of subordinate units, and insure that the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-3, keeps himself updated on current readiness problem
areas. Minutes of the meeting are submitted to the Commanding General
and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is prepared to brief the General, if
required.
c. Utilization of the Division Staff
One of the most significant impacts upon the Marine divi-
sion, as a result of the readiness reporting systems, has been an expansi
of the role of the division staff during decision-making.
Prior to the availability of detailed readiness informati
resulting from the use of the new systems, decision making within :
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division generally followed traditional staff procedures. Under this rrv
of operation, decision making is accomplished by means of each general
and special staff section, analyzing and evaluating a particular problem
in terms of how specific courses of action would affect their particular area
of expertise. The advantages and disadvantages of each course of action
are also carefully weighed and enumerated. A fully staffed recommenda-
tion listing the courses of action in desending order of desirability, com-
plete with advantages and disadvantages for each, is then presented to the
commander. Under this system, when detailed and complete staff work
has been practiced, the problem with its recommended decision and pro-
posed concept for execution reaches the commander as a complete, staffed
paper. The only action required of the commander, following his review
of the package, is a simple approve or disapprove.
This procedure is particularly applicable in planning for
combat operations since it is essential that each proposed course of action
be carefully evaluated against all the various facets of responsibility that
fall under the staff c'ognizance of each general and special staff section.
This step by step formal decision making process is inherent in the sequence
„ 64
of command and staff action outlined in Figure 7.
Formal decision making is still an important part of divisi
U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-1,
Command and Staff Action, Washington, D. C. : Headquarters U. S.
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sta'ff work and will remain so for the forseeablc future. However, the
availability' of detailed readiness information, along with other type a of
situational and status information, has stimulated the desire for more
rapid and responsive decision making. This has resulted in a somewhat
supplemental decision making process.
As a result of this desire, division staff officers must now
be capable of not only functioning as a formal staff, but also be capable of
providing large amounts of data in an organized and rapid manner.
The mechanics of presenting this information for immediate
decision making varies from command to command. However, at the divi-
sion level this generally takes the form of a command briefing such as the
briefing associated with the Division Program Progress Report (discussed
earlier) or any similar briefing required for a specifc command decision.
Required readiness information is gleened from the FORSTAT and MARES
reports. Since the division is in the reporting chain of command, informa-
tion required for internal needs is simply extracted before it is forwarded
to higher headquarters.
The decision making briefing takes place in a specially
designated Division Briefing Room that has been designed to allow the mr
imum presentation of relevant unit, personnel and equipment information.
The physical layout of a typical briefing room is illustrated in Figure 8.
The Commanding General is seated in the center of the room
with his key general and special staff seated to either side and behind n.
























General & Special Staff Officers
Acti on & Proj ect Officers




Figure 8. Typical Division Briefing Room
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view projection screens have been installed.
The actual briefing consists of the presentation of a given
sequence of charts or slides, by a designated briefing officer representing
each staff functional area. With information relevant to a particular de-
cision presented in this manner, the Commanding General can quickly grasp
the important aspects that affect a particular course of action. With his
general and special staff officers, and their various action officers, im-
mediately available, a particular issue can literally be coordinated,
staffed and resolved "on the spot".
The responsibilities of the staff, in this case, has included
the requirement to maintain updated readiness and status briefing charts
and have sufficient backup data to justify any position or support any argu-
ment. The responsibility also includes the requirement to assemble,
organize and present data in such a manner that it supports rapid division
level decision making.
From the above, then, it can be seen that the availability
of detailed readiness data has expanded the decision making apparatus
within the Marine division, and has increased the responsibilities of the
division staff.
D. EFFECT OF CENTRALIZED READINESS REPORTING
SYSTEMS UPON MARINE DIVISION PERSONNEL
The impact of a new system upon the personnel within an organi
is a complex yet very real aspect of todays rapidly changir,
environment. The statements, opinions, and observations, presented in
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this section represent the views of those officers and enlisted men
interviewed in conjunction with this study.
The various aspects of human behavior within organizations has
been an area of interest for many years. Early interest centered around
the manipulation of physical factors (working conditions, etc.) in an effort
to increase production. Over a period of years interest has gradually
shifted away from the workers as a mass and has now focused upon the
management process, which includes all participants from the worker to
the manager, in the modern organization.
Additional factors have contributed to this gradual change of empha-
sis. These include (1) increased automation, (2) finer distinctions in
occupational specialization, (3) refinement of the technical capabilities
of an organization, and (4) the increased affluence of the population in
general. The entire American society is rapidly changing as the nation
enters the post industrial era.
Representing a segment of the overall American society, the Marine
Corps, as well as the other military services, finds itself expo riencing
many of the same trends toward increased automation, specialization and
complexity that have affected all organizations in today's complex work
environment.
"Within a changing environment the FORSTAT and MARES readine
reporting systems represent but one of the various methods devised to
meet the ever increasing information needs of higher level Marine Corps
commands. As might have been expected, Interviews conducted port
of this study, revealed a number of significant impacts upon Marine d.
103

personnel as a result of utilizing the FORSTAT and MARES centrali/
readiness reporting systems. The areas under which these impacts will
be addressed in this section include, (1) the increased visibility of activ-
ities, (2) the role of commander vs manager, (3) career patterns and
specialization, (4) the concept of an inverted organization triangle, and
(5) a discussion concerning resistance to change.
1
.
Increased Visability of Activities
One of the most significant impacts upon the Marine division,
as a result of the new centralized readiness reporting systems, has been
the increased visibility of activities within the division. This was brought
out in response to the specific question "What has been the most signifi-
cant impact upon division personnel as a result of the new readiness re-
porting systems?" Almost without exception those personnel interviewed
commented upon the visibility aspect.
There are obvious advantages and disadvantages associated
with this increased visibility. As an advantage, higher level headquarters
can review a large volume of readiness data associated with many individual
reporting units, and thereby make more effective decisions concerning
overall supply, purchasing, or maintenance policies. This in turn pro-
vides for a better state of readiness at the lower reporting levels. Another
advantage results from the fact that all commanders and their staffs
throughout the reporting chain are talking the same readiness language;
and therefore are more aware of problems thai exist at the Lower leve
With this visibility, by means of a common Language, it Ls ea
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higher headquarters to assist the lower reporting units in their effort!
to resolve problem areas.
The increased visibility, concerning the activities of lower
level reporting units, has also introduced certain disadvantages. Pri-
mary among these is the feeling, by lower units, that they are being
closely scruitinized and second-guessed by higher headquarters.
It is this "fish-bowl" aspect that leads to certain problems.
As an example, it was pointed out that higher headquarters invariably
generate questions when they see a unit in a degraded readiness posture,
(C-3 or C-4 in any of the FORSTAT measured areas, personnel, supplies,
equipment, training, or overall readiness). Although the C-rating cate-
gories, in this example, are computed by percentage, they also involve
an overall judgment consideration by the reporting unit commander. If,
for example, a particular readiness report involved a tank battalion within
the Marine division, it is conceivable that the battalion could be in a
favorable readiness posture percentage wise, (C-l or C-Z), in the area
of supplies and equipment, yet not have a particular item on hand which
in itself seriously degrades the unit's readiness. This particular item
could be 90MM gun barrels. Percentage wise the unit would be in a satis-
factory supply and equipment status, yet it is missing a particular nun.
of new gun barrels, so that the commander feels his ability to accomplish
his mission has been degraded and therefore he feels thai he should carrv
his unit at a lower readiness rating category.
The overall affect of this is that lower level command
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feel that an evaluation of their readiness posture based strictly u:
percentages does not reflect a true evaluation of their capability to per-
form their mission. Yet they are reluctant to lower their readiness
status since they know it will generate questions throughout the reporting
chain.
The net result of this increased visibility aspect, is that
lower level reporting units are under a certain degree of pressure and
therefore have a tendency to report "politically". Reporting politically,
it was stated, is: "a tendency to report what it is felt senior commanders
want to be told". As a result, in some cases, reporting units tend to
stretch the reporting criteria to its maximum and report themselves in
an unrealistically favorable readiness posture.
2. Command Prerogatives and Responsibilities
vs the Role of Manager
Another aspect of the conversion to a centrally controlled,
automated readiness reporting system is centered around the question of
whether reporting unit commanders see the new system as degrading their
prerogatives as commanders and increasing their roles as simply managers,
Surprisingly most of those interviewed felt that they had lost
nothing as a commander. They did not feel they any of their power, au-
thority or prerogatives had been decreased. They did feel, however, that
the role of the individual commander had been expanded and that although
he still commanded an organization in every sense of the word, he nov
had the tools to closely manage the men, money and materials
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hi.s responsibility. A commander has always been responsible for every-
thing his unit does or does not do. However, most unit rornmandorb n
feel that, as a result of the new readiness reporting systems, hi
headquarters possess the required information to constructively assist
them in certain areas. As an example of the effort to further assist lower
level reporting commanders within the division, certain division staff
officers have also been designated as commodity managers (e.g. engineer
officer, communications officer, motor transport officer, and ordance
officer) to determine trends, identify problem areas and in general provide
expert assistance as required.
The net result is that unit commanders feel they can do a better
job of commanding a unit based upon the fact that they now have better tools
to manage their assests and more knowledgeable assistance from higher
levels of command.
3. Career Patterns and Specialization
As the Marine Corps moves further into the era of centrally
controlled reporting systems, the impact upon individual career patterns
increases. The Marine Corps has traditionally insisted that every Marine
is first, last, and always a basic rifleman. This has been one of the com-
mon denominators that has given the Marine Corps a degree of coh< ess
even in its most diversified commands or organizations.
The idea of specialization has always been a problem, especially
in the more technical fields, because it requires early orientation oi
Marine in that particular direction and thereby reduces his opportune
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a broader spectrum of assignments.
The question asked here was as follows: "Is it an advantage
or disadvantage, career wise, for a Marine to become intimately involved
with the readiness reporting system?" Granted that there are many other
areas in which a Marine could become a specialist, but for purposes of
this research the question was limited to just the FORSTAT and MARES
reporting systems.
Responses to this question can generally be divided into two
groups. Some of those officers and enlisted interviewed felt that, to be
successful, a Marine should keep his career as broad and non- specialized
as possible. Others felt that the key to success was to be a specialist in
some particular area but still broaden oneself by means of other assign-
ments as long as they did not distract from one's speciality.
The general consensus to this question was that it is advisable
for all Marines to become intimately involved and familiar with the FORSTAT
and MARES systems, since they have become such an important aspect in
the management of men, money and materials within the Marine Corps.
This is particularly true if a Marine can visualize his career as proceeding
along the paths where this type knowledge is essential. For example, an
officer who has served in a number of operations or logistic related Lgn-
ments and perceives himself as earmarked for additional G-3 or G-4 work




4. The Inverted Triangle Concept
Another question asked was "How do you feel about the fact
that reporting units provide readiness information primarily for use by
higher headquarters? " Responses to this question pointed out the fact
that different types of information must be considered differently, i
example, it was acknowledged that FORSTAT data is not as useful at the
lower levels as it is at higher levels of control. On the other hand, MARES
logistic data is considered an extremely valuable management tool for use
by the reporting unit commanders.
In this regard the concept of an inverted triangle was mentioned.
Many Marines see the traditional bureaucratic organizational triangle as
having been inverted as it relates to readiness reporting. Rather than a
broad base, reporting information up the chain to a small central control
segment at the apex, they see a relatively small number of reporting units
providing more and more information upward to a continually expanding
central authority. The entire issue revolves around the fact that most
Marines prefer to keep the ratio of support troops to combat troops as low
as possible, and therefore do not favor the increasing requirement :
specialists at the higher levels of command.
5. Resistance to Change
The well known concept of resistance to change was the subject
of another question that was asked during the collection of information.
The specific question was "Has there been any resistance to the conv«
to FORSTAT and MARES reporting systems.'
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From the responses obtained, it is apparent that the new
systems have generally been well accepted and any significant resistance
occurred during the earlier stages of development and implementation.
The primary resistance to any new reporting system,
especially at the lower levels, is the fact that it simply represents
another reporting requirement. Until the worth of the system has been
proven, it is usually judged in this light. The administrative burden of
paper work and various reporting systems has always been a problem
within the Marine Corps.
There has been a definite tendency over the past ten years to
centrally obtain and utilize more and more information. This has con-
sistently resulted in the requirement for more and more detailed informa-
tion from the subordinate commanders.
The lack of significant resistance to the FORST.AT and MARES
systems can generally be attributed to the fact that these two particular
readiness reporting systems, even though they are centrally controlled,
have clearly provided a usable management tool, to meet the needs of
not only the Marine divisions, but the overall Marine Corps as well as the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1 10

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION'; - RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has reviewed currently existing centralized readiness
information reporting systems, now in use by the U. S. Marine Corps,
and examined their functional impact upon the U. S. Marine division.
Having completed that analysis, this chapter will summarize significant
aspects of the study, discuss certain general conclusions, and present
some specific recommendations.
A. SUMMARY
In approaching this study, a number of specific objectives were
outlined. These included:
1. A review of the general trend toward centralization of control,
within the Department of Defense, and the ever increasing requirement
for readiness information at the highest levels of control.
2. An examination of the collection, dissemination, management
and usage of operational readiness information within the Marine Corps,
with special emphasis upon activities within a typical Marine divisi
3. An examination of the impact of centralized readiness report-
ing systems upon a typical Marine division.
To accomplish the specific objectives and overall purpose of ' his
study, a model was developed to represent the relationships between th
various factors under review. In addition to providing .1 visual, explan
tory method of organizing the study, the model was also designed to
1 1 1

certain "cause and effect" relationships. The "causal" factors, contrib-
uting to the eventual use of centralized readiness reporting systems, in-
cluded (1) the trend, following World War II, toward unifi< "he
armed services, plus the gradual centralization of control and decision
making at the Department of Defense level, (2) the specific policies and
programs established by Mr. McNamara which led to a high degree of
centralization within the Department of Defense, (3) increased readiness
information requirements during the Vietnam war, and (4) the gradual
development, refinement and availability of the computer. The "effect"
factors, resulting from the utilization of these reporting systems, in-
cluded (1) organizational changes, (2) impact upon decision making, and
(3) the effect upon Marine division personnel.
The overall approach of the study, then, was to (1) start with the
National Security Act of 1947 and provide a chronological analysis of how-
centralization has gradually evolved within the Department of Defense,
(2) identify and describe two operational readiness reporting systems
that are a direct outgrowth of the historical trend toward centralization,
and (3) identify and analyze the observable impacts of these result:
centralized readiness reporting systems upon the U. S. Marine division.
Although centralization was not a consciously established ob
during the years just after World War II, it did gradually evolve as a re-
sult of the efforts toward unification within the Department of I
During the period 1947 to I960 the- driving \or^<- behind the m a a rd
unification was a ligitimate desire to make the A rmed Forc<
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States more responsive to national objectives. The enactment of the
National Security Act of 1947 partially accomplished this by att< ing
to bring the Armed Services under one roof and provide for a n o-
ordinated relationship between military and civilian elements of the
government. Once initiated, the trend toward unification continued.
Ammendments to the 1947 Act and continuing reorganization efforts,
occurring in 1949, 1953 and 1958, contributed to this gradual process.
One of the more significant events during this latter period was the
Reorganization Act of 1958, which introduced the concept of unified and
specified commands and established a clear chain of command from the
President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and specified
commands.
The efforts toward unification of the Armed Services had, by I960,
vastly increased the authority of the Secretary of Defense and shortened
the chain of command to the operational forces. The stage had been suf-
ficiently set to allow a strong Secretary of Defense to bring the Armed
Services to a level of centralized control never before experienced. Am>
the much debated contributions of Mr. McNamara, his continuing requi
ments for information upon which to base decisions led to certain tar-
reaching, long-lasting impacts upon the Armed Services. One of these
impacts, as addressed by this study, was the requirem* c readiness
information to be provided by the individual services. The developn
centralized readiness reporting systems and the subsequent Ln
the operational units, as presented in this study, were the eve
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of 'guidance provided in 1962 by the Department of Defense for th« •;-
ment and operation of a Force Status and Identity Reporting System.
Based upon the guidance provided, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
separate services began the development of centralized readiness report-
ing systems when the Vietnam war added impetus to the effort. The most
significant contribution of the Vietnam war, to the evolving process, was
the increased need for accurate, real-time unit readiness information at
the highest levels within the Department of Defense. Although originally
accomplished by standard message type reporting, it became increasingly
obvious that a more standardized type of reporting was needed to reflect
detailed readiness criteria. As an interim measure, the Operational
Status Reporting System (OPSTAT) was developed and used by the Marine
Corps. Although the report was based upon detailed readiness criteria,
it utilized a complicated format and was still submitted by message.
At the height of the Vietnam war effort, when the requirement for
readiness information was increasing, the availability and utilization of
computers within the Department of Defense had reached the point to allow
automation of the readiness reporting systems.
A wide variety of automated systems have gradually evolved, thro
out the Department of Defense, in recent years. Two of these s- s,
which have had a direct impact upon Marine Corps operational units, were
reviewed by this study as they can be related to the come] I ralizati
of control.
These two centralized readiness reporting systems, the
1 14

of* Staff Force Status and Identify Report (FORSTAT) and Marine Automated
Readiness Fvaluation System (MARES), have had a considerable impact
upon the Marine operational units and are generally viewed as the two
most significant operational readiness type reports currently in use.
A number of significant differences exist between the two reports.
FORSTAT is a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed report and involves the re-
porting of readiness and status of forces information from the reporting
unit level up through the operational chain of command to the Joint Chiefs.
This method of reporting provides readiness information for use by all
levels of command up through the operational chain of command. The
MARES reporting system, on the other hand, is utilized just within the
Marine Corps to report detailed status of readiness information in the areas
of equipment/ supplies on hand and equipment readiness. In addition to
supporting the overall readiness ratings reported in the FORSTAT system,
the intent of the MARES system is to provide a considerable amount of
detailed logistic data for use by operational units throughout the Marine
Corps. Thus these two independent, but intimately related, parallel readi-
ness reporting systems currently provide the readiness information re-
quired to centrally control and direct the activities of the U. S. Marine
Corps.
The utilization of these two centralized, automated, readiness re-
porting systems within the Marine Corps has produced certain observable
impacts at the operational unit levels. The reporting level selected
analysis by this study was the Marine division since thai is the Level v
1 L5

the reports are consolidated and automated for further submission and
also the reporting level at which many significant impacts have occurred.
In analyzing the various impacts upon the Marine division, a re-
view of classical and contemporary organization theory was first con-
ducted and the Marine Corps examined as a bureaucratic organization.
The Marine division was then addressed, as a part of a larger Marine-
Corps bureaucracy, and the various impacts of centralized readiness
reporting systems were discussed.
During the research phase of this study one of the first impacts
identified was the structural changes within the division that had resulted
from the adoption of the two readiness reporting systems. This included
the establishment of a Division Combat Readiness Central/Management
Analysis Section at the division headquarters level, consisting of four of-
ficers and eight enlisted necessary to manage FORSTAT reporting. In
addition, one officer and two enlisted were assigned, on a full time basis,
to a "MARES reporting section". In support of these structural changes
other division staff members are required to be sufficiently knowlcdgable
regarding these reports to insure accurate coordination prior to report
submissions. In addition to the above division staff changes, each of the
32 division reporting units have designated, generally on an additional dv.
basis, one officer and two enlisted to manage FORSTAT reporting and one
officer and two enlisted to handle MARES reporting.
In examining the reporting procedures it was found that appr
2,350 man-hours per month were required for submission of the FO
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report and approximately 8,288 man-hours per month for the MA]
4
report. Compared to an estimated 208 man-hours per month require
under the old OPSTAT system, it was obvious that a considerable in< rease
in man-hour requirements had resulted from adoption of the new reporting
systems.
Another area in which a significant impact was observed was in the
area of decision making at the division staff level. The most important
contribution of the readiness reporting systems, in this area, was the
availability and consistent usage of detailed readiness data in the Division
Program Progress Report System and usage by the division staff during
in-depth decision-making briefings for the Commanding Ceneral.
Certain impacts were also identified regarding Marine division
personnel. Among the most significant of these was the general feeling
that the usage of these reporting systems had increased the visibility of
lower unit activities. Another aspect examined indicated that lower level
reporting unit commanders did not feel that their prerogatives had been
reduced as unit commanders. It was also determined that the resistance
to the new systems had been negligible although some Marines saw cenl
ized reporting as contributing to the growth of a continually expanding
central authority and the inversion of the traditional bureaucratic organ-
izational triangle.
A majority of those interviewed voiced some degree of concern over
the trend toward utilization of centralized systems within the Marine <
However, most felt that the FORSTAT and MARES report in
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generally provided an excellent management tool for use not only by the
lower level operational units but throughout the Marine Cor]
In summary then, this study has add] I the relationship between
(1) the gradual evolution of centralization within the Department of Defense,
(2)r the subsequent development and utilization of two centralized readiness
reporting systems within the Marine Corps, and (3) the resulting impact
of these reporting systems upon the U. S. Marine division.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The period since World War II has witnessed many, far-reaching
changes in the organization and overall management of the U. S. Armed
Forces. During this period successive legislative and administrative
actions have occurred which reflect a continuing effort to integrate the
defense establishment and consolidate power and control at the Secretary
of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and individual service levels.
In light of the requirements to meet national political and military
objectives it appears that high level authorities within the Department of
Defense organization must have access to accurate, timely readiness
posture information. It also seems likely that the requirements for read-
iness information, within the Department of Defense, will not decline but
on the contrary will increase as the United States continues to meet it:
free world commitments. Based upon this reasoning, it is concluded that,
(1) centralized readiness reporting systems will contim




At the Marine division level, centralization La vie-
when allowed to reach dangerous extremes whereby the operational in-
dependence of lower level units is threatened. However, the majority
those Marines interviewed generally viewed the degree of centralization
associated with the FORSTAT and MARKS reporting systems as a ne
condition in obtaining the benefits of these two excellent management tools.
Most of those interviewed also felt that the Marine Corps has been commited
to a course of action in which centralized controlling systems will continue
to be developed and utilized.
Most division level Marines recognize that the Marine Corps, as
well as the environment in which it functions, is continually changing. In
this changing environment, (1) information technology has literally ex-
ploded, (2) weapons lethality and delivery capabilities have improved,
(3) weapons systems have become more complex, and (4) higher levels
of technical ability and proficiency are required of organizational person-
nel. In this regard Marines generally view FORSTAT and MARES cen-
tralized readiness reporting systems as simply representative of one area
in which the Marine Corps has adopted itself to meet the requirements
a more complex environment.
Specific conclusions resulting from this study include the foil
1. The international environment will dictate the continued
use of centralized control systems within the Department of Defense.




3. FORSTAT and MA RE.S cent rali/.cl readin reporting
systems will continue to be used by tbe Marine Corp
.
4. Existing readiness reporting systems will gradually become
more comprehensive and complex as the state of the art impn
5. Most division level Marines are aware of the advantages and
disadvantages associated with centralization in a bureaucratic organization.
6. The level of centralization associated with FORSTAT and
MARES reporting systems is considered as acceptable in light of the
benefits obtained.
7. The use of centralized readiness reporting systems has dic-
tated certain organizational structure changes within the Marine division
and generated significant additional man-hour requirements.
8. Existing readiness reporting systems have had an impact upon
decision making due to the availability of additional detailed information.
9. Marine reporting unit commanders do not view the FORSTAT
and MARES reporting systems as endangering their prerogatives as com-
manders, but see the systems as assisting them in the management of men,
money, and materials.
10. No significant resistance has been encountered concerning the
use of these two readiness reporting systems within the Marine Cor
11. The FORSTAT and MARES centralized readiness rep
systems are considered, by the majority of those Marines interviewed,!




As a result of the analysis conducted during this study the following
recommendations are provided:
1. Prior to any future revision, expansion or updating of the
FORSTAT and MARES readiness reporting systems, it is recommended
that any proposed changes be critically examined and an evaluation be
made of the possible impact upon the lower level reporting units and the
overall Marine Corps to determine if:
a. Proposed changes will result in further centralization of
control, with a view toward avoiding any dilution of commanders' autonomy
and authority unless the benefits clearly override this consideration.
b. Any revisions to the two systems will result in unnecessary
reporting duplication or an increase in man-hour requirements at the re-
porting unit level, with a view toward assuring that the benefits resulting
from changes would exceed any additional resources required to effect the
changes.
c. Changes would generate the requirement for additional
high level staff billets and thereby contribute to an undesirable increase in
the ratio of support troops to combat troops.
d. Proposed changes will alter the value of tin- two rep >rtii
systems as management tools.
2. To obtain the maximum benefits from continued utili
121

FORSTAT and MARES reporting systems, it is recommenced thai ad-
ditional efforts be made to increase the knowledge level of Marine per-
sonnel, regarding these systems, by:
a. Stressing the relative importance and content of th<
reporting systems at appropriate Marine officer's professional schools
(e.g. Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Staff
College, etc. ).
b. Insuring that curriculums of appropriate Marine officer
and enlisted skill courses adequately address these two readiness re-
porting systems, (e.g. Data Systems Officer course, Systems Analysis
and Design Enlisted course, Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy, etc. ).
c. A continuous local education effort at the Marine division
level utilizing lectures, short courses, programmed texts and inclusion of
material in division> level schools.
3. It is recommended that the Marine Corps tables of organization
be updated to include appropriate Marine division headquarters staff bil-
lets within the G-3 and G-4 sections necessary to support the officially
established FORSTAT and MARES readiness reporting systems.
Recommendations resulting from this study are provided for possible
improvements in the continuing development and utilization of centralized






1. Administrative Chain of Command -- The normal chain of command
as determined by the administrative organization.(JCS Pub. 1, p. 3).
2. Amphibious Demonstration -- A lesser included type of amphibious
operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show
of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of
action unfavorable to him. (JCS Pub. 1
, p. 22)
3. Amphibious Operation - An attack launched from the sea by naval
and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing
on a hostile shore. (JCS Pub. 1.
, p. 23).
4. Amphibious Raid -- A limited type of amphibious operation; a
landing from the sea on a hostile shore involving swift incursion
into, or a temporary occupancy of an objective, followed by a
planned withdrawal. (JCS Pub. ]., p. 23),
5. Billet -- A personnel position or assignment which may be filled by
one person. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 45).
6. Chain of Command -- The succession of commanding officers from
a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.
(JCS Pub. 1., 1 Mar 73, p. 56).
7. Command and Control -- The exercise of authority and direction by
a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the ac-
complishment of his mission. Command and control functions are
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, com-
munications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling
forces and operations in the accomplishment of his missi<
(JCS Pub. 1.
, p. 66).
8. Commody Manager -- An individual within the organization of an
inventory control point or other such organization assigned manage-
ment responsibility for a homogeneous grouping of material items.
(JCS Pub. 1
, p. 68)
9. Continental United States (CONUS) -- United States ter . in-
cluding tlu- adjacent territorial waters Located within tl rth
American continent between Canada and Mexico. (JCS Pub. 1, p.
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IjO. Control -- Authority which may be less than full command exercised
by a commander over yja rt of the activities of subordinate or other
organizations. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 76).
11. D-Day -- The unnamed day on which a particular operation com-
mences or is to commence. (JCS Pub. 1
, p. 88).
12. Data -- A representation of facts, concepts or instructions in a
formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or
processing by humans or by automatic means. Any representations
such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might
be assigned. (JCS Pub. 1
, p. 87).
13. Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) -- A uniform system of
progressive alert postures for use between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the commanders of unified and specified commands and for use
by the Services. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 92).
14. Division -- A major administrative and tactical unit/formation which
combines in itself the necessary arms and services required for
sustained combat, larger than a regiment/brigade and smaller than
a corps. (JCS Pub. 1
,
p. 101).
15. Fleet Marine Force -- A balanced force of combined arms comprising
land, air and service elements of the United States Marine Corps.
A Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of a United States Fleet and
has the status of a type command. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 126).
16. Flexible Response -- The capability of military forces for effective
reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and
adaptable to the circumstances existing. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 126).
17. General Staff -- A group of officers in the headquarters of Army or
Marine divisions, Marine brigades and aircraft wines, or smaller or
larger units which assist their commanders in planning, coordinating,
and supervising operations. (JCS Pub. I, p. 134).
18. General War -- Armed conflict between major powers in which the
total resources of the belligerants are employed, and the national
survival of a major bellige rant is in jeopardy. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 13! .
19. M-Day -- The term used to designate the day on which mobilization
is to begin. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 186).
20. National Command Authorities -- The President and the Se< retary of
Defense or their duly deputized alternates or suc< essors. Commonly
referred to as NCA. (JCS Tub. 1, p. 201).
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21. Operational Chain of Command -- The chain of command established
for a particular operation or scries of continuing operations.
(JCS Pub. 1, p. 216).
22. Operational Readiness -- The capability of a unit, ship, weapon
system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for
which it is organized or designed. May be used in a general sense
or to express a level or degree of readiness. (JCS Pub. 1
, p. 21 7).
23. Specified Command -- A command which has a broad continuing mis-
sion and which is established and so designated by the President
through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from
but one service. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 278).
24. Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) -- A set of instructions covering
those features of operation which lend themselves to a definite or
standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. (JCS Pub. 1,
p. 282).
25. Table of Organization and Equipment -- The table setting out the
authorized number of men and major equipment in a unit. (JCS Pub.
1, p. 113).
26. Unified Command -- A command with a broad continuing mission
under a single commander and composed of significant assigned
components of two or more services, and which is established and
so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense
with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when
so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an
existing unified command established by the President. (JCS Pub. 1
,
p. 312).
27. Unit -- Any military element whose structure is prescribed by com-
petent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment;
specifically, part of an organization. (JCS Pub. 1, p. 312).
28. Unit Identification Code -- The six-character alpha -numeric code
which uniquely identifies each organization being reported for the
full period of existence of that organization. (JCS Pub. 6).
29. Wing -- A balanced Marine Corps task organization of aircraft pro-.,
squadrons together with appropriate command, air control, adminis-
trative, service and maintenance units. A standard Marino Cor
aircraft wing contains the aviation element! normally required i
air support of a Marine division. (JCS Pub. 6).
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30. "Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) --
The WWMCCS consists of the facilities, equipment, communica-
tions, procedures, and personnel that provide the technical and
operational support involved in i.ne function of command and control
of U. S. Military forces. (JCS Pub. 6, p. D-10).
All entries in this glossary are taken from the following references:
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT ),
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 6, Vol. II, Part 2, Chapter 1,
Washington, D. C. : The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1974
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publica-
tion 1
,




FORSTAT CARD TYPE FORMATS
This appendix provides a sample format for those FORSTAT
card types normally utilized at the U. S. Marine division reporting
unit level. Brief definitions of significant data elements are provided
where data element designations are not self-explanatory. Complete
definitions and detailed reporting instructions are available in Joint
Chiefs of Staff Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT), JCS
Publication 6, Volume II, Part 2, Chapter I, dated 15 August 1974.
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The unified/specified command or
service to which the organization is
assigned.
-- The geographical location of the unit's
permanent base.
-- The unit's present geographic location.
-- Current activity of the organization.
-- Detached organization created from the
reporting unit's organic resources.
-- Parent of created detachment. For use
by detachments when reporting.
x
-
- Combined command (e.g. NATO, etc.)

































CARD TYPE DM1 -- GENERAL STATUS
DATA CONTINUATION CARD
The abbreviation of billet being reported
(i.e., CG, CO, G-3, etc.).
The command receiving reconciliation
listings from Headquarters Marine Corps
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Includes commissioned officers, warrent
officers, enlisted, etc.
Reflects the structured strength of the
organization.
Indicates personnel permanently author-
ized to the organization.
Indicates personnel permanently assigned
and chargable to the organization.
Indicates personnel physically present.
Indicates total personnel selected to deploy













; USMC GROUND OFFICERS
V USMC AVN GROUND OFFICERS
USMC NAVAL AVIATORS









t US NAVY ENLISTED
: OTHER OFFICERS
"2 OTHER ENLISTED












The category of personnel data being
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FC9T OVERALL READINESS RAT
FORECASTED OATE OF CHANGE
READINESS RATING LIMIT















Includes general readiness, readiness
for contingency operations, etc.
The degree to which an organization is
capable of performing its mission.
The forcasted improvement or reduction
in a unit's cability.
- Service -imposed limitations preventing




CARD TYPE L -- EQUIPMENT AND CREW STATUS DATA
3
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The major equipment/weapon about
which status data is being reported.
Equipment under control of non-U. S.
force (e.g. NATO, Canadian, etc.)
but reported by U. S. forces.
Includes equipment that is operationally
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-- The geographic location at which the
organizations' equipment is temporarily
located.
-- The equipment under operational control
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- The identification of the data upon




FORSTAT READINESS REPORTING CRITERIA
(Marine Division Only)
1 . Reporting under the three measured resource areas,
a. Personnel Readiness
(1) Personnel readiness percentage computations are
based upon the relationship of assigned strength to structured (author-
ized) strength.
(2) Computed percentages are compared with the
following criteria to determine the reportable personnel readiness
rating.
C-l Not less than 90 percent of structured strength
is assigned, including sufficient personnel of essential ranks/MOS's
to enable the organization to operate and maintain all mission-essential
weapons and equipment on a sustained basis.
C-2 Less than 90 percent but not less than 80 percent
of structured strength is assigned, including sufficient personnel of
essential ranks/MOS's.
C-3 Less than 80 percent but not less than 70 percent
of structurel strength is assigned, including sufficient personnel of
essential ranks/MOS's.
C-4 Less than the criteria specified for a C-3 rating.
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b. Equipment and Supplies On Hand (Material Readiness)
(1) Material readiness of reporting units/organizations
is determined by computing the straight percentage of combat-essential
equipment possessed as compared to the total amount authorized.
(2) Percentages obtained in accordance with the above are
compared with the following criteria to determine readiness of equip-
ment/supplies on hand.
C-l Not less than 90 percent of authorized combat-
essential equipment is possessed.
C-2 Less than 90 percent but not less than 80 percent
of authorized combat-essential equipment is possessed.
C-3 Less than 80 percent but not less than 70 percent
of authorized combat-essential equipment is possessed.
C-4 Less than criteria for C-3.
c. Equipment Readiness
(1) Units/organizations reporting under this category will
base reports upon the percentage of combat-essential equipment possessed
and operable as compared to authorized.
(2) Percentages obtained will be compared with the following
criteria to determine equipment readiness.
C-l Not less than 85 percent of authorized combat-
essential equipment is possessed and operable.
C-2 Less than 8 5 percent bul not less than 7 percent
of authorized combat -essential equipment is possessed and operable.
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C-3 Less than 70 percent but not less than 55 percent
of authorized combat-essential equipment is possessed and operable.
C-4 Less than the criteria established for C-3.
d. Training Readiness
(1) Training readiness will be determined by using the
following criteria:
C-l The organization can deploy for a combat mission
without requiring further training. Not less than 85 percent of authorized
crews are combat ready.
C-2 It is desirable that the organization have 2 weeks
of additional training prior to deployment. Less than 85 percent, but not
less than 70 percent, of authorized crews are combat ready.
C-3 It is desirable that the organization have one month
of additional training prior to deployment. Less than 70 percent of auth-
orized crews are combat ready.
C-4 Less than the criteria established for C-3.
e. Composite Readiness
In addition to reporting readiness under the four measured
resource areas, each organization/unit/command submits a composite
readiness rating which reflects the overall combat readiness of that or.
ization /unit/command.
This overall readiness rating is normally the lowest of the
ratings in the four measured resource areas. However, as an exception,
if, in the judgment of the commander, strict application n( the particular
1 3 8

C- rating criteria does not provide a valid picture of the organization's
capability to carry out its assigned mission, a higher or lower overall
readiness rating may be assigned and the commander's justification or





MARES CARD TYPE FORMATS
This appendix provides a sample format for each of those MARES
card types normally utilized at the Marine division reporting unit level.
Brief definitions of significant data elements are provided where data
element descriptions are not self-explanatory. Complete definitions and
detailed reporting instructions are available in (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff
Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT), JCS Publication 6, Volume
II, Part 2, Chapter 1, dated 15 August 1974, (2) Marine Corps Automated
Readiness Evaluation System Logistics User Procedures, Marine Corps
Order 4400. 136, dated 7 August 1974, and (3) Standing Operating Pro-
cedures for Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES)
Logistics, 1st Marine Division Order P3000.5, dated 29 April 1974.
* Note: Regardless of the method by which logistic information is
collected within the division, including the use of locally generated
forms, the division computer output program produces the outgoing
reports in the formats presented in this appendi .
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5 UNIT REQUISITION NUMBER
; (IN COMBINATION WITH
I CC 9-14)
- LAST KNOWN HOLDER
- QUANTITY REQUISITIONED




t TAM CONTROL NUMBER
ID NUMBER
S SERIAL NUMBER (D/L ITEM)
TRANSMITTING COMMAND
"I IDENTIFYING DATA (ENTERED
| BY FMFPAC, FMFLANT, 4TH





















Identifies the organization's requisition
number for the item which is deficient.
Indicates the last known holder of the
requisition.
Federal Stock Number of Deficient Item
- Indicates that requisition is for deficient
combat-essential equipment, exceptional
need for item exists, etc.
- Table of Authorized Material.
- Item Identification Number.
141

CARD TYPE LM2 EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT
- Leave blank



















BY FMFPAC. FMFUANT. 4TH
MAW AND 4TH MARDIV ONLY)
CUHtlHATOK'l UIC
RIKMT IfeOICAro*












- Table of Authorized Material.
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the applicable Julian date.
Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance/In
Transit Status.
Process whereby an organization
receives a float item in exchange for
deadlined equipment and accounts are
adjusted accordingly.
.
Identifies the organization performing
the maintenance upon a deadlined item.
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